G.R. No. 263627, November 4, 2024,

♦ Decision,

Leonen, [J]

♦ Dissenting Opinion Opinion,

J. Lopez, [J]

DISSENTING OPINION

LOPEZ, J.,

J.:

The majority granted the Petition for Review on

Certiorari

filed by Ronald B. Boado (Ronald) and agreed with his contention that he has proven by clear and convincing evidence that his marriage to Florence C. Galvez-Boado (Florence) is null and void considering that he is psychologically incapacitated and therefore cannot perform his essential marital obligations to Florence.

The majority took note that Ronald was diagnosed with Passive-Aggressive Personality Disorder by Dr. Winston Carrera (Carrera) and ruled that such condition, in the context of his marriage with Florence, is sufficient to annul their marriage.

They agreed that Ronald duly proved his psychological disorder and it satisfies all the elements of psychological incapacity,

i.e.,

gravity, incurability, and juridical antecedence, and pointed to the fact that Ronald and Florence were barely physically together during the entirety of their marriage. It was added that Ronald no longer loves Florence as proof of his psychological incapacity.

With due respect, I dissent.

Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code provides what are the essential marital obligations between husband and wife, as follows:

Art. 68.

The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect, and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.

Art. 69.

The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide.

The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family.

Art. 70.

The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The expenses for such support and other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community property and, in the absence thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from the separate properties.

Art. 71.

The management of the household shall be the right and the duty of both spouses. The expenses for such management shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70.

Notably, Section 36 of the Family Code provides that

a marriage contracted by any party who at the time of the celebration was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations is void:

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

The guidelines for interpreting and applying Section 36 of the Family Code was first laid down in

Republic v. Molina:

From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x

. . . .

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

(Citation omitted)

Twenty-four years later, this Court had cause to, and thus modified, its interpretation and application of the doctrine of psychological incapacity in its seminal ruling in

Tan-Andal v. Andal:

To recall, the term "psychological incapacity" was first defined by this Court in

Santos

as a "mental (not physical) incapacity" to comply with the essential marital obligations. The term was confined to "the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage." This characterization became the basis of the second

Molina

guideline, where parties to a nullity case are required to present evidence of the root cause of the psychological incapacity. In particular, this root cause must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts.

By equating psychological incapacity to a "mental incapacity" and to "personality disorders," this Court went against the intent behind Article 36. The Code Committee was clear that psychological incapacity is not a mental incapacity. Among the earlier wordings of the provision on psychological incapacity included "mentally incapacitated," and "mentally" is obviously absent in the present Article 36. This means that for the Code Committee, "mental" is not synonymous with "psychological."

. . . .

Yet, to comply with the second

Molina

guideline, psychologists and psychiatrists, when serving as expert witnesses, have been forced to assign a personality disorder and pathologize the supposedly psychologically incapacitated spouse. This cruelty could not have been the intent of the Code Committee.

It took time before this Court, in the 2000 case of

Marcos v. Marcos

, declared that "a medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to." Instead, as this Court said, "the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity[.]"

. . . .

In light of the foregoing, this Court now categorically abandons the second Molina guideline. Psychological incapacity is neither a mental incapacity nor a personality disorder that must be proven through expert opinion. There must be proof however, of the durable or enduring aspects of a person's personality, called "personality structure," which manifests itself through clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermines the family. The spouse's personality structure must make it impossible for him or her to understand and, more important, to comply with his or her essential marital obligations.

Proof of these aspects of personality need not be given by an expert. Ordinary witnesses who have been present in the life of the spouses before the latter contracted marriage may testify on behaviors that they have consistently observed from the supposedly incapacitated spouse. From there, the judge will decide if these behaviors are indicative of a true and serious incapacity to assume the essential marital obligations.

. . . .

Difficult to prove as it may be, a party to a nullity case is still required to prove juridical antecedence because it is an explicit requirement of the law. Article 36 is clear that the psychological incapacity must be existing "at the time of the celebration" of the marriage, "even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."

This distinguishes psychological incapacity from divorce. Divorce severs a marital tie for causes, psychological or otherwise, that may have developed after the marriage celebration.

According to Dean Estrada-Claudio, "it is an accepted principle of all major and recognized theoretical schools within psychology that a person's behavior is determined by the interaction of certain genetic predispositions and by his or her environment, working in iterative loops of influence."

From this, proof of juridically antecedent psychological incapacity may consist of testimonies describing the environment where the supposedly incapacitated spouse lived that may have led to a particular behavior. For instance, violence against one's spouse and children can be a manifestation of juridically antecedent psychological incapacity when it is shown that the violent spouse grew up with domestic violence or had a history of abusive romantic relationships before the marriage.

. . . .

Furthermore, not being an illness in a medical sense, psychological incapacity is not something to be cured. And even if it were a mental disorder, it cannot be described in terms of being curable or incurable. Dean Estrada-Claudio explained that true mental disorders follow a probable course or outcome, called "prognosis," that can either be self-limited or remain "stable across time and consistent in situations." If self-limited, the disorder is, in layperson's terms, "curable." If it has poor long-term prognosis, the disorder is said to be "incurable."

That psychological incapacity is "incurable," but in a legal sense, is evident in the deliberations of the Code Committee. This was explained by Justice Eduardo P. Caguioa, when he said that "'incurable' has a different meaning in law and medicine."

. . . .

Reading together the deliberations of the Code Committee and our rulings in Santos and Molina, we hold that the psychological incapacity contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code is incurable, not in the medical, but in the legal sense; hence, the third Molina guideline is amended accordingly. This means that the incapacity is so enduring and persistent with respect to a specific partner, and contemplates a situation where the couple's respective personality structures are so incompatible and antagonistic that the only result of the union would be the inevitable and irreparable breakdown of the marriage. "[A]n undeniable pattern of such persisting failure [to be a present, loving, faithful, respectful, and supportive spouse] must be established so as to demonstrate that there is indeed a psychological anomaly or incongruity in the spouse relative to the other."

With respect to gravity, the requirement is retained, not in the sense that the psychological incapacity must be shown to be a serious or dangerous illness, but that "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" are excluded. The psychological incapacity cannot be mere "refusal, neglect[,] or difficulty, much less ill will." In other words, it must be shown that the incapacity is caused by a genuinely serious psychic cause.

(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Navarrosa v. Navarrosa

this Court further refined the requisites of juridical antecedence, incurability, and gravity in determining psychological incapacity as follows:

In light of the Court's fundamental paradigm shift in viewing psychological incapacity as a purely legal, rather than a medical concept, the understanding of the requisites in determining psychological incapacity, namely, juridical antecedence, incurability, and gravity, must be refined accordingly.

With regard to the requisite of incurability, it must now be recognized that psychological incapacity is incurable only in the legal (not medical) sense in that the incapacity is "so enduring and persistent with respect to a specific partner, and contemplates a situation where the couple's respective personality structures are so incompatible and antagonistic that the only result of the union would be the inevitable and irreparable breakdown of the marriage." In order for the said requisite to obtain, there must be "[a]n undeniable pattern of a persisting failure to be a present loving, faithful, respectful, and supportive spouse that must be established so as to demonstrate that there is indeed a psychological anomaly or incongruity in the spouse relative to the other."

Meanwhile, the requisite of gravity in psychological incapacity must be such that it is caused by a genuinely psychic cause, and not just "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes [or] occasional emotional outbursts" nor mere "refusal, neglect[,] difficulty, much less ill will." As such, "a deeper and fuller assessment of the alleged incapacity must be done such that it is clearly and convincingly shown that the fulfillment of the essential marital obligations is not merely feigned or cumbersome but rather, practically impossible, because of the distinct psychological makeup of the person relative to his or her spouse."

Lastly, the requisite of juridical antecedence (which – to note – is explicitly necessitated by the phrase "at the time of the celebration of the marriage" in Article 36) means that the incapacity is determined to exist during the time of celebration. While it may indeed be difficult—if not scientifically impossible—to determine the existence of psychological incapacity at the exact point in time that the couple exchanged their 'I dos,' it is sufficient however, that the petitioner demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence, that the incapacity; in all reasonable likelihood, already exists at the time of the marriage's celebration. To determine the reasonable likelihood of its existence at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the Court, in

Tan-Andal,

held that "proof of juridically antecedent psychological incapacity may consist of testimonies describing the environment where the supposedly incapacitated spouse lived that may have led to a particular behavior."

Moreover, the concept of juridical antecedence must be understood to include the ordinary experiences of the spouses not only prior to the marriage itself, but more importantly, during their "lived conjugal life" together since, as the law itself states, a marriage can be declared null and void under Article 36 "even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization." As the parties have yet to assume any of the essential marital obligations prior to being married, the Court discerns that the experience of marriage itself is the litmus test of self-realization, reflecting one's true psychological makeup as to whether or not he or she was indeed capable of assuming the essential marital obligations to his or her spouse at the time the marriage was entered into.

Therefore, in order to determine juridical antecedence, "judges must reconstruct the marital decision-making process of an individual, just like inquisitive investigators. The judge must trace back and examine all the manifestations before and during marriage to find out if such non-fulfillment relates to the intrinsic psychological makeup of the person relative to his or her specific partner, and not just some mere difficulty that ordinary spouses, at some point in time, axe bound to go through."

Overall, the focus should be on the manifestations during the marriage itself since, as intended by Canon Law from which psychological incapacity was patterned after, the lived conjugal life is that which provides a confirmation of the original consent or its absence at the time of the marriage's celebration. Since there is no way to determine the existence of psychological incapacity at the exact point that vows were exchanged, it is enough that it exists at such time in all reasonable likelihood. This is determined, in turn, by the manifestations and circumstances attending before, and most significantly, during the marriage.

(Citations omitted)

Thus, based on prevailing jurisprudence, the party claiming that they or their spouse is suffering from psychological incapacity must prove by clear and convincing evidence that such psychological incapacity: (1) must have a genuine psychic cause and is of such gravity that it is practically impossible to fulfill the essential marital obligations relative to his or her spouse; (2) is incurable in a legal sense such that it is so enduring and persistent with respect to a specific partner that the only result of the union would be the inevitable and irreparable breakdown of the marriage; (3) exists at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Expert testimony or the testimony of a psychologist/psychiatrist is no longer required to prove psychological incapacity.

Ordinary witnesses who have been present in the spouses' lives before they contracted marriage may testify on their observations as to the incapacitated spouse's behavior or describe the incapacitated spouse's past experiences or environment growing up, which may have triggered one's particular behavior. What is important is that the totality of evidence is sufficient to support a finding of psychological incapacity.

Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, Ronald failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is psychologically incapacitated in the context of Article 36 of the Family Code, and consequently, that his marriage with Florence should be declared null and void.

II (A)

Cayabyab-Navarrosa

this Court held that for the requisite of incurability to be considered present, there must be "[a]n undeniable pattern of a persisting failure to be a present, loving, faithful, respectful, and supportive spouse that must be established so as to demonstrate that there is indeed a psychological anomaly or incongruity in the spouse relative to the other."

No such pattern was shown here. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals,

Ronald's own account of the circumstances surrounding his marriage showed that, not only was he capable of, but at one point did perform his obligations to Florence as her husband. He professed that he loved Florence,

even married her twice,

lived with her,

and was faithful to her.

Ronald also provided for his family by going abroad to work on several occasions.

While there were rough patches along the way, Ronald exerted efforts to fix whatever marital issues that he and Florence might have had as shown by his attempts to and eventual reconciliation with his wife in 2011.

More, it is telling that Ronald himself admitted that it was only in 2016 when he told Florence that he no longer loved her did he desist in performing his marital obligations to her.

To be sure, instead of proving by clear and convincing evidence that he has persistently failed to fulfill his obligations to be a present, loving, faithful, respectful, and supportive spouse to Florence, Roland proved otherwise and showed that he exerted earnest efforts to fulfill his essential marital obligations to his wife. Clearly, Ronald's personality structure, which was manifested through his actions towards Florence up until 2016, does not support a finding that it is impossible for him or her to understand and, more important, to comply with his essential marital obligations.

II (B)

Ronald also failed to prove the requisite of incurability. Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates

incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will.

Here, it must be emphasized that, by Ronald's own account, he was a loving, faithful, respectful, and supportive spouse to Florence

up to the point that he no longer wanted to be one.

To be sure, no clear and convincing evidence was offered by Ronald to prove that he is incapable of performing his marital obligations to Florence

or that his previous performance of such obligations was in any way feigned or forced by reason of his personality structure or personality disorder.

II (C)

Similarly, no evidence was offered by Ronald that his Passive-Aggressive Personality Disorder, or a personality structure that renders impossible his continued marriage with Florence, existed prior to their marriage to prove the requirement of juridical antecedence. More, the record of the case is not only devoid of any mention of a specific instance prior or during his marriage with Florence where Ronald manifested that he is incapable of performing his marital obligations but is in fact littered with examples where Ronald performed his marital obligations to his wife.

As for Ronald's insistence that Dr. Carrera's professional opinion that his Passive-Aggressive Personality Disorder satisfies all the requisites of psychological incapacity should be the final word on the matter,

it is patently without any merit. Psychological incapacity is now neither a mental incapacity nor a personality disorder that must be proven by expert opinion.

It should be viewed in the legal sense and established by clear and convincing proof of consistent behavior of the psychologically incapacitated spouse which consist of an undeniable pattern of failing to be present, loving, faithful, respectful, and supportive.

A review of Dr. Carrera's report, which was reproduced in the Decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court

as well as portions of Dr. Carrera's testimony that Ronald quoted in the Petition

does not show the presence of the requisites of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The report and testimony of Dr. Carrera only contained general statements that Ronald's personality disorder was rooted in his mother being a strict disciplinarian

and that it is characterized by gravity, is incurable, and had developed during his childhood.

However, it was bereft of any detail regarding: (1) how Ronald's personality disorder would render impossible his continued marriage to Florence; (2) a specific account of a pattern of behavior on the part of Ronald which shows that he is incapable of performing his essential marital obligations to his wife; and (3) specific instances where Ronald would manifest his personality disorder during his marriage to Florence. Verily, Dr. Carrera's professional opinion that Ronald is suffering from a personality disorder, by itself and absent any substantiation how such personality disorder prevents him from fulfilling his marital obligations to Florence, is not sufficient to support a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Notably, Ronald presented another witness during trial, his longtime friend Greg Pascual (Greg), to ostensibly prove his psychological incapacity.

However, Greg's testimony is similarly bereft of any mention how Ronald's personality disorder manifested itself prior or during his marriage to Florence and how such condition prevented Ronald from performing his marital obligations to Florence. Instead, Greg's testimony merely echoed that of Ronald insofar as it showed that the latter was capable of and did perform his obligations to Florence.

III.

Despite the foregoing, the majority still opined that Ronald was able to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is psychologically incapacitated.

They pointed out that Ronald and Florence were barely physically together during their marriage as a manifestation of his incapacity.

However, it must be noted that the fact that Ronald and Florence lived separately for the majority of their marriage was primarily caused by economic reasons as both Ronald and Florence had to work abroad or in parts of the country other than where their family resides to sustain their needs.

As for the fact that Ronald was able to and previously performed his marital obligations to his wife, the majority brushed that aside by stating that just because he was able to perform some of his marital obligations does not mean that he cannot be subsequently incapable of performing some of his other obligations,

i.e.,

loving his wife.

I disagree.

The fact that Ronald was previously willing and able to fulfill his essential marital obligations to Florence, coupled by the lack of any evidence that such fulfillment was in any way feigned or forced, should have negated any finding that Ronald is psychologically incapacitated.

Tan-Andal

this Court ruled that to prove psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the durable or enduring aspects of a person's personality or his "personality structure" make it impossible for him or her to understand and, more important, to comply with his or her essential marital obligations. This "psychological incapacity" will manifest itself through "clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermines the family." The party asserting that they or their spouse is psychologically incapacitated must then present evidence to establish a pattern of behavior that they or their spouse has exhibited which proves the required "personality structure." It will then be up to the judge to determine if these behaviors are indicative of a true and serious incapacity to assume the essential marital obligations.

Thus, in

Clavecilla v. Clavecilla,

this Court affirmed that "there must be proof of the consistent behavior of the psychologically incapacitated spouse" and that this should show "an undeniable pattern of failing to be present, loving, faithful, respectful, and supportive."

From the foregoing, it is apparent that their previous actions and behavior prior and during the marriage would ultimately determine whether someone is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill their essential marital obligations.

In this case, Ronald was previously able to fulfill all his essential marital obligations to his wife, except that of living together, which was mostly due to economic reasons. There is no pattern of behavior on record which showed that Ronald is incapable of understanding and performing his marital obligations to his wife. However, Ronald now insists that he no longer loves his wife and tries to claim that his inability to do so can be traced back to his childhood experiences and his overly strict mother.

However, Ronald failed to establish causality between his personality structure and his purported inability to no longer love his wife. There is no evidence on record that he did not understand and is not capable of fulfilling his marital obligations. What is clear is that

he no longer wants to do so now.

Notably, in

Rivo v. Rivo,

this Court ruled that previous fulfillment of the essential marital obligations runs counter to a finding of psychological incapacity and "falling out of love," unless caused by a genuine psychic cause, is not sufficient to dissolve the vinculum of marriage:

Tan-Andal

emphasized that the psychological incapacity must be shown to have been existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage, and is caused by a durable aspect of one's personality structure, one that was formed before the parties married.

Here, based on the narrative of events offered by respondent and Marlene, it is undeniable that petitioner was a faithful and loving husband to respondent and a responsible parent to his children before he met his present partner, Perla. Their marriage was blissful, and their family life was peaceful and harmonious until petitioner started philandering. However, it is noteworthy that after petitioner's first extra-marital affair, he exerted efforts to reconcile with respondent and reunite with his family. It was only in the second instance of infidelity where petitioner got too involved with Perla that eventually led him to abandon their conjugal dwelling.

Thus, by petitioner's own statements and admissions in his petition and in his testimony in court, he has displayed full knowledge and understanding of his obligations and has, in fact, committed positive acts towards building and sustaining a family.

(awÞhi(

This exhibits his genuine awareness of his marital obligations, which clearly negated his claim of juridically antecedent psychological incapacity.

Moreover, apart from the claim of Marlene that their father has a history of extra-marital affairs to make it appear that petitioner's psychological capacity is deeply rooted in his childhood, no other convincing evidence was adduced to demonstrate how and to what extent their father's philandering ways correlate to petitioner's alleged disorder, and how it incapacitated him to understand and comply with his marital obligations. All that Marlene claimed was that petitioner was a silent type during his childhood days. Neither was there proof of petitioner's behavior or habits during his adolescent years that could explain his behavior during the marriage.

On the contrary,

it was indubitably established that at the inception of their marriage, petitioner was faithful and caring to respondent. Petitioner's sister herself testified that petitioner's union with respondent was smooth sailing and that it began to crumble only after they had kids, that is after 12 years of being together. Thus, there was no showing that petitioner's defects were already present at the time of celebration of their marriage.

. . . .

Given the foregoing, We find no concrete evidence to support a finding that petitioner's alleged disorder is rooted in his history antedating the marriage.

In the same vein, We are not convinced that petitioner's alleged incapacity is caused by a genuinely serious psychic cause.

An examination of petitioner's testimony reveals that he has fallen out of love of respondent due to his dissatisfaction towards her rather than a psychological disorder rooted in his personality. He cited reasons such as, respondent's lack of time and attention to him and the children on account of the business and respondent's neglect of her personal hygiene.

In fact, petitioner admitted that the marriage collapsed due to their irreconcilable differences which became more complicated when he had an affair with another woman. This clearly suggests that petitioner's failure to continue his common life with respondent stems from his refusal, not downright incapacity to do so.

Tan-Andal

stressed that the psychological incapacity cannot be mere "refusal, neglect, or difficulty, much less ill will." Also, it has always been held that mere irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitute psychological incapacity. Verily, an unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage.

(Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)

In fine, there is no evidence that Ronald's personality structure or the fact that he has Passive-Aggressive Personality Disorder renders him unable to fulfill his essential marital obligations to Florence. By his own account, he is more than capable of fulfilling such obligations but merely refuses to do so now that he has had a change of heart regarding how he feels for his wife.

While it is true that this Court's interpretation of psychological incapacity has been correctly restated in light of scientific progress, jurisprudential developments and other contemporary circumstances, surely it has not evolved so far that a mere change of heart by one of the parties to a marriage would be considered as psychological incapacity and therefore sufficient to dissolve the marital bond.

Accordingly, I vote to

DENY

the Petition and

SUSTAIN

the validity of the marriage between Ronald B. Boado and Florence C. Galvez-Boado.

Footnotes

Rollo,

pp. 11-28.

Ponencia, p. 14.

Id.

at 13.

Id.

at 13-14.

335 Phil. 664 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].

Id.

at 676-679.

902 Phil. 558 (2021) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

Id.

at 595-600.

922 Phil. 565 (2022) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division].

Id.

at 570-573.

Carullo-Padua v. Republic,

922 Phil. 758, 768 (2022) [Per J. Hernando, Second Division].

Pugoy-Solidum v. Republic,

922 Phil. 552, 559 (2022) [Per J. Hernando, Second Division].

922 Phil. 565 (2022) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second Division].

Id.

at 571.

Rollo,

p. 42.

Id.

at 14.

Id.

at 13.

Id.

at 13-14.

Id.

at 13.

Id.

at 13-14.

Id.

at 14.

Id.

at 14-15.

Rollo,

p. 22.

Tan-Andal v. Andal,

902 Phil. 558, 597 (2021) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

Alberto v. Alberto,

922 Phil. 423, 430 (2022) [Per J. Inting, First Division]. (Citation omitted)

Rollo,

pp. 71-73.

Id.

at 19-21.

Id.

at 72.

Id.

at 20-21.

Id.

at 36.

Ponencia, p. 13.

Id.

at 13-14.

Rollo,

pp. 13, 31-32.

Ponencia, p. 14.

902 Phil. 558, 597 (2021) [Per J. Leonen, En Banc].

Id.

at 597.

Clavecilla v. Clavecilla,

G.R. No. 228127, March 6, 2023 [Per J. Gesmundo, First Division].

Id.

at 23. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the Decision uploaded in the Supreme Court website.

Rollo,

pp. 20-22.

G.R. No. 210780, January 25, 2023 [Per J. Hernando, First Division].

Id.

at 7-9. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the Decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.

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