FIRST DIVISION
June 27, 2018
G.R. No. 196015
RURAL BANK OF MABITAC, LAGUNA, INC., represented by MRS. MARIA CECILIA S. TANAEL, Petitioner
vs.
MELANIE M. CANICON and MERLITA L. ESPELETA, Respondents
D E C I S I O N
JARDELEZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Rural Bank of Mabitac, Laguna, Inc., (petitioner), seeking to nullify the Court of Appeals' (CA) September 29, 2010 Decision2 and March 4, 2011 Resolution3 in CA-G.R. SP No. 104984 (collectively, Assailed Decision). The CA, in its Assailed Decision, denied petitioner's petition for certiorari under Rule 65 against the October 23, 2007 Order4 of Branch 31 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pedro, Laguna which set aside its November 15, 2006 Resolution,5 and reinstated its September 17, 2003 Order6 in Criminal Case No. 12508-B.
Petitioner filed a criminal complaint for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in relation to economic sabotage, against its employees Rica W. Aguilar (Aguilar), Melanie M. Canicon (Canicon), and Merlita L. Espeleta (Espeleta). Prosecutor Alfredo P. Juarez, Jr. (Prosecutor Juarez) conducted a preliminary investigation, where Espeleta and Canicon submitted their counter-affidavits. Prosecutor Juarez found probable cause against the three employees and recommended the filing of an information for estafa.7
On April 24, 2003, an information8 for estafa in relation to Presidential Decree No. 16899 was filed against Aguilar, Canicon, and Espeleta before the RTC of Biñan, Laguna, which was later transferred to the RTC of San Pedro, Laguna. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 12508-B. Subsequently, the RTC, through Judge Stella Cabuco-Andres (Judge Cabuco-Andres), issued a warrant for the arrest of all three accused. Only Espeleta and Canicon were arrested, while Aguilar remains at large. 10
On June 12, 2003, Espeleta filed an urgent motion for reinvestigation11 before the RTC. She claimed that the preliminary investigation was conducted hastily, thereby denying her the chance to present her evidence. Petitioner opposed the motion. Without resolving the urgent motion for reinvestigation, the RTC arraigned both Espeleta and Canicon on June 30, 2003. Both accused entered a plea of not guilty to the offense charged. 12
Meanwhile, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Melchorito M. E. Lomarda (Prosecutor Lomarda) conducted a reinvestigation. In a Report13 dated July 28, 2003 (Lomarda Report) approved by the Provincial Prosecutor, Prosecutor Lomarda recommended the dismissal of the case against Espeleta and the filing of an amended information. On August 4, 2003, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor filed a motion for leave to amend the information 14 with attached amended information. 15 The amended information dropped Espeleta from the list of those originally charged, and recommended bail for all the remaining accused. 16
The RTC, through Judge Cabuco-Andres, issued the September 17, 2003 Order17 granting the provincial prosecutor's motion and admitted the amended information. Petitioner sought reconsideration of the September 17, 2003 Order.
Meanwhile, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San Pedro, Laguna, through Prosecutor Lomarda, denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the Lomarda Report on September 26, 2003. 18
The RTC, this time through Judge Zenaida G. Laguilles (Judge Laguilles), issued the November 15, 2006 Resolution19 which recalled and set aside the September 17, 2003 Order issued by Judge Cabuco-Andres. Judge Laguilles ruled that a procedural misstep was committed when Prosecutor Lomarda conducted the reinvestigation without prior leave of court. The seeming acquiescence of former Presiding Judge Cabuco-Andres (in admitting the amended information) will not cure the procedural infirmity committed. As such, the reinvestigation conducted without judicial imprimatur is a nullity and created no vested right. 20
Espeleta and Canicon filed their respective motions for reconsideration (with supplemental motion for Espeleta) of the November 15, 2006 Resolution, which petitioner opposed.21
In its October 23, 2007 Order,22 the RTC, through Judge Rommel O. Baybay (Judge Baybay), granted private respondents' motion for reconsideration. It set aside the November 15, 2006 Resolution and reinstated the September 17, 2003 Order. The RTC held that the public prosecutor has the sole discretion to decide whether to indict a person. More, it found that reinstating the charge against Espeleta would violate her right against double jeopardy:
In any event, the fact remains that an Urgent Motion for Reinvestigation was seasonably filed and there was an Opposition thereto. While no written order was issued granting the said motion, neither also was there any order denying it. Thus, when the public prosecutor proceeded with the reinvestigation and, thereafter, filed the Amended Information, accompanied by a Motion for Leave to Amend Information and to Admit Amended Information, the Court, in granting the motion and admitting the Amended Information is deemed to have ratified the reinvestigation conducted. In other words, by granting the public prosecution leave to amend the Information and admitting the Amended Information, the Court, in effect, recognized the validity of the reinvestigation as if it were conducted with judicial imprimatur.
x x x x
[T]he matter of deciding whether or not to indict a person criminally charged or to proceed with the criminal action already commenced against him rests solely on the government prosecutor. This is so because in criminal cases, the real offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant, whose role is merely to testify as a witness for the prosecution, being limited to the civil liability.
Moreover, the Court sustains the argument of accused Espeleta that her reinstatement as a co-accused in this case as a result of the setting aside of the Order admitting the Amended Information which excluded her from the charge would violate her constitutional right against double jeopardy. This contention of hers finds support in the analogous case of People vs. Vergara. The High Court's pronouncements therein, which accused Espeleta quoted in her present motion, are squarely applicable to the case at bar. 23 (Citations omitted.)
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner, but the same was denied in an Order dated April 21, 2008.24 Thus, it filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA, attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC.
The CA denied certiorari. It ruled that the petition suffered from a fatal procedural infirmity because a private prosecutor cannot prosecute the criminal aspect of a criminal case. The determination of probable cause as to warrant a criminal prosecution rests solely at the discretion of the public prosecutor.25 The CA also said that "when [the trial court] admitted the amended information which dropped Espeleta among those to be charged, it effectively dismissed the case against the latter."26 The judgment of the prosecutor to drop Espeleta, and the RTC's acquiescence to this judgment by admitting the amended information, cannot be considered as grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court; "[t]he criminal prosecution will always remain under the absolute control of the public prosecutor, and his judgment cannot be substituted by the opinion of the private prosecutor [or] by the court."27
Petitioner insists that the CA erred in not finding that the R TC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the October 23, 2007 Order. First, its right to due process was violated (1) when the public prosecutor conducted a reinvestigation, and (2) when the RTC allowed the amendment of the information. The public prosecutor loses the sole discretion to determine the existence of probable cause when an information is filed in court. Hence, the prosecutor's office cannot conduct a reinvestigation without prior leave and approval by the court; the determination of probable cause is now at the sole discretion of the court. More, petitioner was not notified when the prosecutor's office conducted reinvestigation. Neither was petitioner notified when Prosecutor Lomarda filed a motion for leave to amend information and to admit amended information, in violation of the rules.28 According to petitioner, due process requires that it be notified by the trial court at all stages of the proceedings as it is a "party" who may be affected by the orders issued and/or judgment rendered therein.29 Second, petitioner also argues that the RTC (through Judge Cabuco-Andres) did not exercise the discretion required by law. Judge Cabuco-Andres merely approved the position taken by Prosecutor Lomarda without assessing the evidence on record. Such is not a valid and proper exercise of judicial discretion. 30 Finally, petitioner alleges that as private prosecutor, it has locus standi in filing the necessary pleadings in Criminal Case No. 12508-B. Since it did not file a separate civil action or reserve its right to file the same, petitioner claims that as the party injured by the crime, it had the right to be heard on a motion that was derogatory to its interest in the civil aspect of the case. It also alleges that it could not secure Prosecutor Lomarda's conformity because petitioner filed a criminal case against him. 31
In her comment, 32 Canicon notes that petitioner does not question the merits of the Lomarda Report but merely attacks it on technicalities. She further alleges that petitioner does not have locus standi. The true complainant who would be prejudiced is the State or the People of the Philippines, not petitioner. The error in not procuring the conformity of the public prosecutor in filing the petition before the CA, and in this case, is further aggravated by the failure to notify or inform the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).33 Espeleta adopts Canicon's arguments and adds that her inclusion as respondent in this petition is a violation of her right against double jeopardy since the September 17, 2003 Order had validly dismissed the criminal offense against her after her arraignment. 34
The issues presented are:
I. Whether petitioner has standing to file the petition without the conformity of the OSG.
II. Whether the present petition, which seeks the reinstatement of the original information, places Espeleta in double jeopardy.
III. Whether the CA erred in not finding grave abuse of discretion on the RTC in issuing the October 23, 2007 Order that reinstated the September 17, 2003 Order:
a. Whether petitioner was deprived of due process when the R TC admitted the amended information based on the reinvestigation, despite the alleged lack of notice to the petitioner of the reinvestigation and the motion.
b. Whether the trial court made its own independent evaluation of the evidence when it admitted the amended information dropping Espeleta as accused.
We grant the petition.
I
The OSG has the sole authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the Supreme Court and the CA. 35 The rationale behind this rule is that in a criminal case, the party affected by the dismissal of the criminal action is the State and not the private complainant. 36 The interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited only to the civil liability.37 In the prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. Thus, when a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. The private offended party or complainant may not take such appeal; but may only do so as to the civil aspect of the case. 38
Nevertheless, we have recognized instances where a private complainant would have standing to file a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 against the dismissal of a criminal case. In Dee v. Court of Appeals,39 we affirmed the CA's decision granting certiorari to a private complainant against a trial court's order dismissing the criminal case for estafa upon recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. We reiterated this in Perez v. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc. 40 where we said:
The private respondent, as private complainant, had legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case against the petitioner on the ground that the order of dismissal was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.Second.
In the case of Dela Rosa v. Court of Appeals, we held that:
''In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, the complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in (the) name of the said complainant."
Thus, while it is only the Solicitor General that may bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or State in criminal proceedings pending in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, the private offended party retains the right to bring a special civil action for ce1iiorari in his own name in criminal proceedings before the courts of law.
Furthermore, our ruling in the case of Dee v. Court of Appeals allowing the private offended party to file a special civil action for certiorari to assail the order of the trial judge granting the motion to dismiss upon the directive of the Secretary of Justice is apropos. We held therein that although the correct procedure would have been to appeal the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice to the Office of the President, the said remedy was unavailable to the private offended party as the penalty involved was neither reclusion perpetua nor death. Hence, as no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law was available to the private offended party, filing of the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was proper.41 (Emphasis supplied; italics and citations omitted.)