G.R. No. 181912 (2016) - Separate Opinion

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION

SERENO, J.:

I fully agree with the majority’s view that courts have a legal duty to consider the factors provided in Section 17 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, as amended. I also agree that deviation therefrom is authorized, provided it is explained and is supported by the evidence on record. I only write this opinion to make a clarification.

To my mind, there should be no conflict between the duty to consider the factors laid down by Section 17, as amended, and the established rule that the determination of just compensation is a judicial function.

R.A. No. 9700 amended Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 to make the consideration of the factors enumerated therein mandatory. Using the word "shall," the amended provision now reads:

SEC. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. – In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the value of the standing crop, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, the assessment made by government assessors, and seventy percent (70%) of the zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), translated into a basic formula by the DAR shall be considered, subject to the final decision of the proper court. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to the property as well as the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation. (Emphases Supplied)

With the amendment, courts are now bound to consider the enumerated factors in the determination of just compensation.1 For reasons to be discussed below, this does not straitjacket them and thereby unduly restrain their power to determine just compensation, which has been established to be exclusively a judicial function.2

Section 17 does not tread on dangerous grounds. All that it requires is the consideration by the courts of the enumerated factors. The provision does not mandate that they use those factors exclusively for the determination of just compensation. Congress even circumscribed the consideration of the factors with the clause, "subject to the final decision of the proper court." They are, at most, guidelines to assist the courts in the determination of just compensation. Therefore, Section 17 does not take away, much less limit, the power of the courts to inquire into what EPZA v. Dulay termed the "justness" of the compensation.3

We should give effect to the legislatively mandated mode of valuation as prescribed in Section 17, following the default rule in the interpretation of statutes:

In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.4

R.A. No. 6657 was designed to breathe life to the constitutional mandate for land reform5 In particular, the valuation method under Section 17 reflects the wisdom of Congress in prescribing the manner of implementing the constitutional mandate. I see no reason why we should not accord the provision the presumption of constitutionality that it fairly deserves.6 We must consequently avoid an interpretation whereby the constitutional directive for land reform would be rendered ineffective.

Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the Petition and REMAND the case to the Special Agrarian Court for a proper determination of the just compensation.1âwphi1

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION

CARPIO, J.:

The application of DAO 11, s. of 1994, as amended by DAO 5, s. of 1998, is not mandatory on Special Agrarian Courts in the determination of just compensation. I submit this Separate Concurring Opinion to clarify further the first paragraph of Section 18 of Republic Act No. 6657 (RA 6657) or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.

The first paragraph of Section 18 of RA 6657 reads:

Section 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. - The LBP shall compensate the landowner in such amounts as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and the LBP, in accordance with the criteria provided for in Sections 16 and 1 7, and other pertinent provisions hereof, or as may be finally determined by the court, as the just compensation for the land. (Emphasis supplied)

This provision on valuation of just compensation consists of two parts. The first part refers to the amount of just compensation "as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and the LBP" while the second part pertains to the amount of just compensation "as may be finally determined by the court." In other words, the amount of just compensation may either be (1) by an agreement among the parties concerned; or (2) by a judicial determination thereof.

In the first case, there must be an agreement on the amount of just compensation between the landowner and the DAR. Such agreement must be in accordance with the criteria under Sections 16 and 17 of RA 6657.1 Section 16 outlines the procedure for acquiring private lands while Section 17 provides for the factors to be considered in determining just compensation. To translate such factors, the DAR devised a formula, which is presently embodied in DAO No. 5.2 The DAR, using the formula in DAO No. 5, will make an initial determination of the value of the land and thereafter offer such amount to the landowner. If the landowner accepts the DAR's offer, he shall be paid the amount of just compensation as computed by the DAR. If the landowner rejects the DAR's offer, he may opt to file an action before the courts to finally determine the proper amount of just compensation.3 Clearly, the DAR cannot mandate the value of the land because Section 18 expressly states that the landowner shall be paid the amount of just compensation "as may be agreed upon" by the parties. In other words, the DAR's valuation of the land is not final and conclusive upon the landowner. Simply put, the DAR's computation of just compensation is not binding on the landowner.

Since the landowner is not bound to accept the DAR's computation of just compensation, with more reason are courts not bound by DAR's valuation of the land. To mandate the courts to adhere to the DAR's valuation, and thus require the courts to impose such valuation on the landowner, is contrary to the first paragraph of Section 18 which states that the DAR's valuation is not binding on the landowner. If the law intended courts to be bound by DAR's valuation, and to impose such valuation on the landowner, then Section 18 should have simply directly stated that the landowner is bound by DAR's valuation. To hold that courts are bound by DAR's valuation makes resort to the courts an empty exercise. To avoid violating Section 18, courts must be given the discretion to accept, modify, or reject the DAR's valuation.

The law itself vests in the Regional Trial Courts, sitting as Special Agrarian Courts (SAC), the original and exclusive jurisdiction over actions for the determination of just compensation. Section 57 of RA 6657 reads:

Section 57. Special Jurisdiction. - The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this Act.

The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from submission of the case for decision. (Emphasis supplied)

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Montalvan,4 the Court reiterated the exclusive jurisdiction of the SAC to determine just compensation, to wit:

The SAC has been statutorily determined to have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation due to landowners under the CARP. This legal principle has been upheld in a number of this Court's decisions and has passed into the province of established doctrine in agrarian reform jurisprudence. In fact, this Court has sustained the exclusive authority of the SAC over the DARAB, even in instances when no administrative proceedings were conducted in the DARAB.