Third DIVISION

January 11, 2017

G.R. No. 193340

THE MUNICIPALITY OF TANGKAL, PROVINCE OF LANAO DEL NORTE, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. RASAD B. BALINDONG, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Shari’a District Court, 4th Judicial District, Marawi City, and HEIRS OF THE LATE MACALABO ALOMPO, represented by SULTAN DIMNANG B. ALOMPO, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

JARDELEZA, J.:

The Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines1 (Code of Muslim Personal Laws) vests concurrent jurisdiction upon Shari'a district courts over personal and real actions wherein the parties involved are Muslims, except those for forcible entry and unlawful detainer. The question presented is whether the Shari'a District Court of Marawi City has jurisdiction in an action for recovery of possession filed by Muslim individuals against a municipality whose mayor is a Muslim. The respondent judge held that it has. We reverse.

The private respondents, heirs of the late Macalabo Alompo, filed a Complaint2 with the Shari'a District Court of Marawi City (Shari'a District Court) against the petitioner, Municipality of Tangkal, for recovery of possession and ownership of a parcel of land with an area of approximately 25 hectares located at Barangay Banisilon, Tangkal, Lanao del Norte. They alleged that Macalabo was the owner of the land, and that in 1962, he entered into an agreement with the Municipality of Tangkal allowing the latter to "borrow" the land to pave the way for the construction of the municipal hall and a health center building. The agreement allegedly imposed a condition upon the Municipality of Tangkal to pay the value of the land within 35 years, or until 1997; otherwise, ownership of the land would revert to Macalabo. Private respondents claimed that the Municipality of Tangkal neither paid the value of the land within the agreed period nor returned the land to its owner. Thus, they prayed that the land be returned to them as successors-in-interest of Macalabo.

The Municipality of Tangkal filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss3 on the ground of improper venue and lack of jurisdiction. It argued that since it has no religious affiliation and represents no cultural or ethnic tribe, it cannot be considered as a Muslim under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws. Moreover, since the complaint for recovery of land is a real action, it should have been filed in the appropriate Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte.

In its Order4 dated March 9, 2010, the Shari'a Distric.t Court denied the Municipality of Tangkal's motion to dismiss. It held that since the mayor of Tangkal, Abdulazis A.M. Batingolo, is a Muslim, the case "is an action involving Muslims, hence, the court has original jurisdiction concurrently with that of regular/civil courts." It added that venue was properly laid because the Shari' a District Court has territorial jurisdiction over the provinces of Lanao del Sur and Lanao del Norte, in addition to the cities of Marawi and Iligan. Moreover, the filing of a motion to dismiss is a disallowed pleading under the Special Rules of Procedure in Shari'a Courts.5

The Municipality of Tangkal moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the Shari' a District Court. The Shari' a District Court also ordered the Municipality of Tangkal to file its answer within 10 days.6 The Municipality of Tangkal timely filed its answer7 and raised as an affirmative defense the court's lack of jurisdiction.

Within the 60-day reglementary period, the Municipality of Tangkal elevated the case to us via petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with prayer for a temporary restraining order8 (TRO). It reiterated its arguments in its earlier motion to dismiss and answer that the Shari' a District Court has no jurisdiction since one party is a municipality which has no religious affiliation.

In their Comment,9 private respondents argue that under the Special Rules of Procedure in Shari'a Courts, a petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the district court is a prohibited pleading. Likewise, the Municpality of Tangkal' s motion to dismiss is disallowed by the rules. They also echo the reasoning of the Shari' a District Court that since both the plaintiffs below and the mayor of defendant municipality are Muslims, the Shari' a District Court has jurisdiction over the case.

In the meantime, we issued a TRO10 against the Shari'a District Court and its presiding judge, Rasad Balindong, from holding any further proceedings in the case below.

In its petition, the Municipality of Tangkal acknowledges that generally, neither certiorari nor prohibition is an available remedy to assail a court's interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss. But it cites one of the exceptions to the rule, i.e., when the denial is without or in excess of jurisdiction to justify its remedial action. 11 In rebuttal, private respondents rely on the Special Rules of Procedure in Shari' a Courts which expressly identifies a motion to dismiss and a petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the court as prohibited pleadings.12

Although the Special Rules of Procedure in Shari' a Courts prohibits the filing of a motion to dismiss, this procedural rule may be relaxed when the ground relied on is lack of jurisdiction which is patent on the face of the complaint. As we held in Rulona-Al Awadhi v. Astih:13

Instead of invoking a procedural technicality, the respondent court should have recognized its lack of jurisdiction over the parties and promptly dismissed the action, for, without jurisdiction, all its proceedings would be, as they were, a futile and invalid exercise. A summary rule prohibiting the filing of a motion to dismiss should not be a bar to the dismissal of the action for lack of jurisdiction when the jurisdictional infirmity is patent on the face of the complaint itself, in view of the fundamental procedural doctrine that the jurisdiction of a court may be challenged at anytime and at any stage of the action. 14