G.R. No. 268546 (2024)

G.R. No. 268546, August 6, 2024,

♦ Decision,

Caguioa, [J]

♦ Concurring Opinion,

Leonen, [J]

♦ Dissenting Opinion,

Lazaro-Javier, [J]

Manila

EN BANC

[ G.R. No. 268546, August 06, 2024 ]

AN WARAY PARTY-LIST, REPRESENTED BY FLORENCIO GABRIEL "BEM" NOEL, AND VICTORIA ISABEL NOEL, IN HER OWN PERSONAL CAPACITY, PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DANILO T. PORNIAS, JR.,

•

AND JUDE A. ACIDRE, RESPONDENTS.

D E C I S I O N

CAGUIOA,

J.:

Before the Court is a

Petition for Certiorari with Urgent Prayer for Preliminary Injunction, Temporary Restraining Order and/or Status

Quo Ante

Order with Motion for Conduct of Special Raffle

1

(Petition) filed under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which assails the following Resolutions issued by public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in SPP No. 19-008:

1. Resolution

2

dated June 2, 2023 of the COMELEC Second Division, granting the petition of private respondents Danilo T. Pornias, Jr. (Pornias) and Jude A. Acidre (Acidre) for cancellation of the registration of petitioner An Waray Party-List (An Waray) as a party-list organization; and

2. Resolution

3

dated August 14, 2023 of the COMELEC

En Banc

, denying petitioners An Waray and Victoria Isabel Noel's (Victoria) (collectively, petitioners) motion for reconsideration.

The Facts and Antecedent Proceedings

An Waray is a duly registered multi-sectoral party-list organization which participated in the 2013 National and Local Elections (NLE).

4

For the 2013 NLE, An Waray's nominees were: (1) Neil Benedict A. Montejo (Montejo); (2) Acidre; and (3) Victoria. An Waray obtained a total of 541,205 votes or 1.96% of the total votes cast for party-lists, thereby emerging as one of the winners of seats in the House of Representatives (HoR).

5

Thus, in Resolution No. 0006-13

6

dated May 24, 2013 of COMELEC sitting as the National Board of Canvassers (NBOC), An Waray was one of the 14 party-list groups proclaimed as initial winners, guaranteed with one seat each.

On May 28, 2013, the NBOC issued Resolution No. 0008-13

7

which cancelled the registration of some party-list groups, resulting in the adjustment of the seat allocations. Due to this realignment, An Waray's number of seats was increased to two "without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations or coalitions which may later on be established to be entitled to one guaranteed seat and/or additional seat."

8

On May 29, 2013, An Waray's second nominee, Acidre, submitted his resignation from the party, citing "pressing personal reasons."

9

Consequently, Victoria succeeded as An Waray's second nominee.

On June 5, 2013, the NBOC issued a Certificate of Proclamation (CoP) to An Waray as one of the winning party-lists in the 2013 NLE, entitling its first nominee, Montejo, to sit in the HoR.

10

On June 26, 2013, Montejo took his oath of office before then House Speaker Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. (Speaker Belmonte).

11

Premised on the tally indicated in NBOC Resolution No. 0008-13, An Waray's second nominee, Victoria, took her oath of office separately on July 13, 2013 before Senator Francis Joseph "Chiz" Escudero.

12

The counsel for An Waray sent a letter to the NBOC requesting for a CoP in favor of its second nominee, Victoria. In its Resolution No. 0018-13

13

dated July 17, 2013, the NBOC merely noted the letter-request.

14

On July 16, 2013, the COMELEC

En Banc

accepted Acidre's resignation from An Waray through Minute Resolution No. 13-0085.

In a Decision dated October 22, 2013, the Court in

Abang Lingkod Party-List v. COMELEC

15

(

Abang Lingkod

) reversed COMELEC's cancellation of Abang Lingkod's party-list registration. The Court thus ordered COMELEC to proclaim Abang Lingkod as one of the winning party-list groups during the 2013 NLE.

16

On August 20, 2014, COMELEC issued NBOC Resolution No. 13-030 (PL)/0004-14 where it declared the

final

distribution of seats for party-list groups in accordance with the Court's computation in the landmark case of

Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. COMELEC

17

(

BANAT

). In the said Resolution, An Waray was listed as entitled to only one guaranteed seat.

18

In the years following the 2013 NLE, An Waray continued to participate in the party-list elections and was able to secure one seat in the HoR in 2016, another seat in 2019, and another seat in 2022.

On May 10, 2019, Pornias, invoking his alleged standing as a registered voter and taxpayer, and Acidre, then a sitting second nominee of Tingog Sinirangan Party-List in the HoR, filed with COMELEC a petition

19

for the cancellation of An Waray's registration pursuant to Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7941

20

or the "Party-List System Act". They asserted that Victoria, with the knowledge and consent of An Waray, deliberately took her oath of office as a Member of the 16th Congress not only without having been validly proclaimed by the NBOC, but also when An Waray was finally adjudged to have been legally entitled to one seat only.

21

On this score, Pornias and Acidre submitted a Memorandum dated November 29, 2018 issued by COMELEC Regional Election Director for Region VIII, certifying that, "[b]ased on the records at hand, this office did not issue any Certificate of Proclamation to Atty. Victoria Isabel G. Noel, 2nd nominee of An Waray Party-List."

22

They posited that the aforementioned acts constitute a violation of election laws by An Waray and Victoria, thus justifying the cancellation of An Waray's registration under Section 6(5)

23

of Republic Act No. 7941.

24

In their Joint Verified Answer,

25

An Waray, represented by their then sitting Representative in the HoR, Florencio Gabriel "Bem" Noel (Bem), and Victoria, countered that from the time An Waray assumed its second seat through Victoria in 2013, no one ever questioned the same. As such, Victoria was able to discharge her official duties as representative of An Waray, without any interruption in accordance with NBOC Resolution No. 0008-13, which has not been revoked, amended, or vacated by COMELEC.

26

They also averred that the petition failed to present any legal basis in its conclusion that An Waray or Victoria committed any violation of election laws.

27

Ruling of the COMELEC Second Division

In its assailed Resolution dated June 2, 2023, the COMELEC Second Division granted the petition to cancel An Waray's registration, thus:

WHEREFORE

, premises considered, the Petition is

GRANTED

. The registration of AN WARAY Party-list is cancelled.

Let the records of the case be forwarded to the Law Department of this Commission for the conduct of preliminary investigation relative for (

sic

) possible elections offense/s committed.

SO ORDERED.

28

(Emphasis in the original)

The COMELEC Second Division emphasized that NBOC Resolution No. 0008-13 expressly stated that the declaration of seats allocated to the party-list groups mentioned was "without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations or coalitions which may later on be established to be entitled to one guaranteed seat and/or additional seat."

29

Further, NBOC Resolution No. 0008-13 was effectively superseded by NBOC Resolution No. 13-030 (PL)/0004-14 on August 20, 2014, following the promulgation of the

Abang Lingkod

Decision. As for the total number of seats of An Waray, NBOC Resolution No. 13-030 (PL)/0004-14 clearly provided that, with the votes garnered by An Waray, they secured a total of ONLY one seat in the HoR. Having known this, An Waray allegedly arrogated unto itself the authority to have its second nominee, Victoria, take her oath and assume office in the HoR, constituting a ground to cancel its party-list registration under Republic Act No. 7941.

30

Ruling of the COMELEC

En Banc

In the second assailed Resolution dated August 14, 2023, the COMELEC

En Banc

, denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration, to wit:

WHEREFORE

, premises considered, the Commission (

En Banc

)

RESOLVED

, as it hereby

RESOLVES

, to

DENY

the Motion for Reconsideration for utter lack of merit. The Resolution of the Second Division is hereby affirmed.

SO ORDERED.

31

(Emphasis in the original)

It ruled that Pornias and Acidre were able to establish by substantial evidence that An Waray committed a serious infraction of the law by allowing Victoria to assume office in the HoR when Section 13

32

of Republic Act No. 7941 requires prior proclamation by COMELEC therefor.

33

The Present Petition

Petitioners An Waray and Victoria now seek relief through the present Petition against the assailed Resolutions of COMELEC, alleging that: 1) since the resolution of the Petition against them is dependent on the validity of Victoria's proclamation as a Member of the HoR, thus falling under "returns" in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's (HRET) exclusive jurisdiction over contests involving the election, returns, and qualifications of such HoR members;

34

2) assuming that COMELEC does have jurisdiction and that Victoria's assumption as Member of the HoR in 2013 violated election laws, the cancellation of An Waray's registration is too harsh a penalty, considering the lack of evidence that An Waray itself participated in the so-called scheme;

35

3) COMELEC should have dismissed the petition for cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) after it failed to decide the case within 60 days as mandated in Article IX-A, Section 7

36

of the Constitution, because the same constituted a violation of petitioners' right to speedy disposition of cases guaranteed under Article III, Section 16

37

of the Constitution;

38

4) in failing to dismiss the petition despite the violation of petitioners' right to speedy disposition of cases although it dismissed

motu proprio

several election offense cases from the 2010, 2013, and 2016 NLEs on the same ground, COMELEC violated petitioners' right to the equal protection of laws;

39

5) An Waray is being stripped of its membership in the HoR for an alleged offense that was committed over 10 years ago in 2013;

40

and 6) the alleged violation of the election law has already prescribed because under Section 267

41

of the Omnibus Election Code

42

(OEC), election offenses shall prescribe after five years reckoned from the date of commission.

43

Petitioners additionally pray for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, Temporary Restraining Order and/or Status

Quo Ante

Order (WPI/TRO/SQAO) against the execution of the assailed Resolutions which will cause irreparable injury on An Waray as a duly elected and registered party-list for many years.

44

In the Resolution

45

dated August 29, 2023, the Court

En Banc

required both COMELEC and private respondents to file their respective comments on the Petition and application for injunctive relief.

In its Comment,

46

filed through the Office of the Solicitor General, COMELEC contends that: 1) the issue in this case is not Victoria's continued membership in Congress since she has already ceased to discharge her official duties, but An Waray's entitlement to participate in the party-list elections and COMELEC was vested with the jurisdiction to determine the same;

47

2) while NBOC Resolution No. 0008-13 named An Waray as an initial winner garnering two seats in the HoR, this did not equate to COMELEC's proclamation of Victoria as required under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 7941 for party-list representatives;

48

3) petitioners should be deemed to have waived their right to a speedy disposition of the case due to their failure to timely invoke the same, until an unfavorable resolution was already issued against them by COMELEC;

49

and 4) their claim of prescription is not tenable because the present case is not an election offense case.

50

COMELEC also opposes the prayer for the issuance of a WPI/TRO/SQAO, arguing that petitioners have no clear legal right to participate in the party-list elections as this is a mere privilege granted to those compliant with the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941, and that there is no urgency warranting the grant of these provisional remedies since the subsequent party-list elections is slated to happen much later in 2025.

51

Private respondents, on the other hand, allege: 1) that their petition sought to cancel the registration of An Waray as a party-list organization, a matter falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of COMELEC; it was neither a case to disqualify Victoria nor a petition for

quo warranto

against her;

52

2) moreover, as Victoria was not a validly proclaimed Member of the HoR, COMELEC retained jurisdiction over contests relating to her election, returns, and qualifications;

53

3) there was no prescription because An Waray's acts were unconstitutional, thus, cannot prescribe;

54

and 4) because An Waray failed to raise violation of their right to speedy disposition of cases before COMELEC, they effectively waived the same.

55

Private respondents also oppose the issuance of a WPI/TRO/SQAO, raising the same arguments as COMELEC above.

56

Finally, private respondents emphasize that in accordance with the COMELEC Rules of Procedure (COMELEC Rules), the assailed Resolutions have become final and executory as, in fact, an entry of judgment has been made on September 19, 2023.

57

Later, petitioners filed a Manifestation,

58

informing the Court that Bem has received an official communication from the Secretary General of the HoR that he has been dropped from the HoR's Roll of Members in view of the finality of the assailed COMELEC

En Banc

Resolution. Petitioners reiterated the urgent need for the issuance of a SQAO in view of the actual and irreparable damage being suffered by Bem and the electorate he represents.

In their Supplemental Comment/Opposition,

59

private respondents additionally aver that since Acidre was originally the second nominee and he resigned only on May 29, 2013, which COMELEC only accepted on July 16, 2013, Victoria was not yet the second nominee entitled to the additional seat when she took her oath of office on July 13, 2013.

60

They also filed a separate Comment/Opposition to Petitioner's Manifestation,

61

reiterating petitioners' alleged failure to establish their entitlement to injunctive relief.

Issues

1) Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it cancelled An Waray's registration as a party-list organization.

2) Whether the HRET, not COMELEC, has jurisdiction to cancel An Waray's registration as a party-list whose nominees became a Member of the HoR.

3) Whether An Waray's constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases was violated by COMELEC.

4) Whether the petition to cancel the registration of An Waray as a party-list has already prescribed.

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

At the outset, the Court resolves the issue of jurisdiction. Specifically, An Waray alleges that the HRET has exclusive jurisdiction over the case because Bem and Victoria had already become members of the HoR. Respondents counter that it is COMELEC which has jurisdiction, as clearly and categorically provided in the Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941. The significance of this issue in the present case is that if it is the HRET that has sole jurisdiction, then the same likewise excludes the Court and only after the HRET has decided and such decision has been brought to the Court on petition for review can the Court properly take cognizance of the case.

It is well to mention that the COMELEC-HRET jurisdiction issue is a staple issue raised in virtually every case involving the qualifications or eligibilities of candidates for Congress and the Senate which are filed with these two bodies or with the Court, if the same are resolved after such candidates have already won in the elections. In most of these cases, the underlying issue of whether the candidate has already legally become a Member of the HoR oftentimes becomes the determinant question, the answer to which identifies the body having jurisdiction. Thus, in most of these cases, the controversy and the arguments revolved around the requisites of becoming a Member of the HoR, that is: 1) a valid proclamation, 2) a valid oath of office, and 3) assumption to the office sought.

This is

not,

however, the determinant issue in this case. That Bem and Victoria became HoR Members and the relevant dates therefor are facts which are not contested. The issue here is whether the cancellation of An Waray's registration falls under the HRET's jurisdiction on account of its effect upon the status of Bem's membership in the HoR and the validity of Victoria's past membership therein. Stated otherwise, the jurisdiction issue here relates more to the nature of the action filed, assuming as a given that petitioner party-list won in the last elections and has a nominee sitting as a Member of the HoR.

COMELEC has the exclusive jurisdiction to rule on the cancellation of An Waray's party-list registration, as it is categorically provided such power to cancel party-list registrations under the law.

Foremost, as jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law, reference to the Constitution or statute is necessary. The main case from which the present

certiorari

petition stemmed, is a petition for the cancellation of An Waray's party-list registration. Hence, to determine which body possesses jurisdiction over the case, one need only to refer to the law conferring the same.

Jurisdiction over cancellation of party-list registrations is categorically conferred by Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7941 on COMELEC, thus:

SEC. 6.

Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration.

– The COMELEC may,

motu proprio

or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse

or cancel

, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:

(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes;

(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;

(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;

(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two percentum (2%) of the votes cast under the party­-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. (Emphasis supplied)

This power of COMELEC is recognized in the Constitution, as it likewise grants to COMELEC the concomitant power to register party-list organizations. Article IX-C, Section 2 provides:

SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

. . . .

(5)

Register,

after sufficient publication,

political parties, organizations, or coalitions

which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be refused registration.

Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to elections constitute interference in national affairs, and, when accepted,

shall be an additional ground for the cancellation of their registration with the Commission, in addition to other penalties that may be prescribed by law.

(Emphasis supplied)

The power of COMELEC to register party-lists is echoed in Republic Act No. 7941, which confers upon COMELEC the sole and exclusive jurisdiction to act on petitions for registration of party-lists, after the same is published and after the parties are given due notice and hearing. Needless to say, the discretion of COMELEC when it acts on petitions for registration includes denying such petitions. Republic Act No. 7941 provides:

SEC. 3.

Definition of Terms.

– (a) The

party-list system

is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system.

. . . .

SEC. 5.

Registration.

– Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the COMELEC may require:

Provided,

That the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.

The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.

The COMELEC shall, after due notice and hearing, resolve the petition within fifteen (15) days from the date it was submitted for decision but in no case not later than sixty (60) days before election.

Clearly, both the Constitution and the statute—Republic Act No. 7941—categorically vest in COMELEC the power and authority to decide on matters relating to an organization's participation in the party-list system—from the grant or denial of its petition for registration as a party, organization or coalition to participate in the party-list elections, to the cancellation of a previously granted registration.

The HRET does not have jurisdiction over petitions to cancel the registration of party-lists, including those whose nominees are incumbent Members of the HoR.

Despite the unequivocal mandate of the law and the Constitution on COMELEC's jurisdiction over party-list registrations, the question of which between COMELEC and the HRET has jurisdiction over the petition to cancel An Waray's party-list registration is still a fair one to ask under the circumstances. In fact, as mentioned, this is a recurring issue raised in virtually every similar election case filed in either COMELEC or the HRET, and one that, as in the instant Petition, is oftentimes even brought up on review with this Court.

This is because, unlike the general concept of jurisdiction in that once it is acquired by a court over a subject matter, its authority over the case attaches until final judgment is rendered,

62

the jurisdiction of COMELEC over cases involving the qualifications and eligibilities of candidates for representatives in the HoR transfers to the HRET when such candidates win and thereby assume office before the case filed before COMELEC is finally decided by it.

This peculiar phenomenon is a function of the fact that the respective jurisdictions of COMELEC and the HRET are exclusive and that they arise successively with a very short window of time in between. This exclusivity remains even in a case involving the same candidate and the same subject matter.

To illustrate, a petition to disqualify can only be filed after the deadline for the filing of a CoC and until the date of proclamation of the winners.

63

A petition to cancel or deny due course to a CoC must be filed within five days from the deadline to file CoCs

64

until 25 days from when such assailed CoC was actually filed.

65

This deadline to file CoCs normally falls about three months before the election date.

66

On the other hand, the jurisdiction of the HRET, following jurisprudence, arises after a candidate has been elected, proclaimed, has taken the proper oath of office and then assumed the position of Member of the HoR. Under normal circumstances, such assumption coincides with the start of the term of the office which is on June 30 following the elections.

67

As such, petitions for disqualification and petitions to cancel/deny due course to a CoC of a winning candidate for Member of the HoR only has a lifetime of about four months, before the jurisdiction of the HRET arises, at which point such petitions must be dismissed—by COMELEC or by this Court if on review—because the HRET's own jurisdiction has arisen ousting all other bodies of authority to take cognizance of the case. This situation occurs regardless of whether an actual case is filed before the HRET. In other words, COMELEC—or the Court on review—is without discretion but to dismiss the case pending before it if the HRET's jurisdiction has already attached because the respondent candidate has already become a Member of the HoR.

Thus, in cases pending with COMELEC—or the Court on review—involving incumbent members of the HoR and the resolution of which case can lead to the removal of such members, the relevant question to ask is this: does the case fall under the HRET's exclusive jurisdiction so that COMELEC—or the Court—will have to dismiss the same for having lost its own jurisdiction over the case?

In the case of the petition to cancel An Waray's registration, the answer to this question is "no."

To recall, petitioners' insistence on the HRET's jurisdiction over the case is grounded on the fact that Victoria had already assumed her position as a Member of the HoR when

Abang Lingkod

was promulgated (which allocated, with finality, only one seat to An Waray, leaving none for Victoria to sit in as the second nominee). Further, they argue that the resolution of the instant Petition is dependent on a finding of Victoria's valid proclamation. Thus, this issue is covered by the word "returns" in Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution on the HRET's jurisdiction.

During the deliberations, Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier (Justice Javier) manifested support for this proposition, saying that COMELEC cannot be given a

carte blanche

jurisdiction when it comes to the registration and cancellation of party-list organizations. According to Justice Javier, although the original cause is the cancellation of the party-list's registration, the

result

is the removal of a sitting Member of the HoR. Hence, Justice Javier opines that it is the HRET which should have exclusive jurisdiction over the instant Petition.

Again, jurisdiction being conferred by law, reference here should be made to the law providing for the HRET's jurisdiction. That law is no less than the Constitution, which states in Article VI:

SECTION 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the

sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members.

Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. (Emphasis supplied)

This is echoed in the HRET's Rules of Procedure

68

(HRET Rules):

RULE 15.

Jurisdiction.

– The Tribunal is the

sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members

of the House of Representatives.

To be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation; (2) a proper oath; and (3) assumption of office.

What is clear from these provisions is the intent of its framers to limit the jurisdiction of the HRET to only

contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Members

of the HoR.

Article VI, Section 17 may, thus, be broken down into two tiers: 1) as to the nature of the action—that is, that it must be a contest relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the respondent; and 2) as to the status of the respondent—that is, he or she must be a Member of the HoR, which, in turn, requires the concurrence of the requisites mentioned in the second paragraph of Rule 15,

i.e.

, (a) a valid proclamation; (b) a proper oath of office; and (c) an assumption to the office of a Representative.

In

Javier v. COMELEC

69

(

Javier

), the Court had the occasion to dissect the nature of a case that falls under the HRET's jurisdiction. Specifically,

Javier

defined the phrase "elections, returns, and qualifications," to wit:

The phrase "election, returns and qualifications" should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee's title. But if it is necessary to specify, we can say that

"election" referred to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes; "returns" to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the winners, including questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns; and "qualifications" to matters that could be raised in

a quo

warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy.

70

(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, in the present case, the component issues of the main jurisdiction question are: a) whether the respondent An Waray in the petition for cancellation of registration as party-list is an incumbent Member of the HoR; and b) whether the nature of the case is one of a contest relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of An Waray.

In

ABC (Alliance for Barangay Concerns) Party List v. COMELEC

71

(

ABC

), the Court held that although it is the party-list that voters vote for during the elections, it is its nominee who sits as a Member of the HoR and who must observe all the qualifications therefor under Article VI of the Constitution.

72

This distinction is important in determining which between the HRET and COMELEC has jurisdiction over a case affecting a party-list who has a nominee sitting as an incumbent representative in the HoR. As it is the nominee—and not the party-list— who is the Member of the HoR, then the HRET's jurisdiction is limited only to cases involving the election, returns, and qualifications of the sitting nominee, and not those of the party-list.

This is the Court's ruling in

ABC,

when it affirmed COMELEC's jurisdiction over petitions to cancel party-list registrations, while likewise taking care to distinguish this from the power of the HRET over determinations of qualifications of individual members of the HoR, including nominees of such party-list organizations. The Court held:

[T]he Constitution grants the COMELEC the authority to register political parties, organizations or coalitions, and the authority to cancel the registration of the same on legal grounds. The said authority of the COMELEC is reflected in Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941, which provides:

Section 6.

Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration.

— The Comelec may

motu proprio

or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:

(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes;

. . . .

It is, therefore, clear that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the instant petition for cancellation of the registration of the ABC Party-List.

In the case of the party-list nominees/representatives, it is the HRET that has jurisdiction over contests relating to their qualifications. Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives, but it is the party-list nominee/representative who sits as a member of the House of Representatives.

73

(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, in the present case involving a petition to cancel the party-list registration of An Waray, as An Waray is not a Member of the HoR, the case cannot fall under the HRET's jurisdiction. COMELEC, thus, retains its jurisdiction over such cases pursuant to Republic Act No. 7941 and the Constitution, as discussed above.

Neither can Victoria's membership in the HoR trigger the jurisdiction of the HoR. Apart from her not being the respondent in the main petition for cancellation, she is likewise not an incumbent HoR Member, as her term has long ended. Inasmuch as the respondent in an election case must have already been proclaimed as winner in the elections, had taken the proper oath of office, and had assumed as Member of the HoR, he or she must still possess such status,

i.e.

, his or her term has not ended, in order for the HRET to retain jurisdiction over questions on the respondent's election, returns, and qualifications. Here, Victoria had long ceased to be a Member of the HoR; thus, any ruling on this specific issue will no longer affect her as such Member, such issue being ripe only insofar as it determines whether An Waray committed a ground to cancel its registration.

Moreover, while it is true that the removal of An Waray from the registered list of party-lists will necessarily cause the removal of its representative in the HoR for the 2022 to 2025 term—Bem Noel—the same cannot, of and by that fact alone, trigger the jurisdiction of the HRET. Apart from Bem, like Victoria, not being the respondent in the main petition to cancel registration, the nature of the case itself is not one of a contest relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of a Member of the HoR.

The Court cannot subscribe to the submission of An Waray that as the case concerns the validity of the proclamation of Victoria, the same falls under the definition of a contest involving the returns of an HoR Member. Again, Victoria is no longer an incumbent Member. Moreover, the case is not a contest involving the returns of Victoria inasmuch as it is merely a petition for the deregistration as a party-list of An Waray.

That the nominee, not the party-list, is the Member of the HoR is all the more evident when one examines the requisites to becoming such a Member, as already settled in jurisprudence—that the candidate has been previously proclaimed winner, that he or she had taken the proper oath of office, and that he or she had assumed office as a Member of the HoR.

74

Evidently, a party-list, having merely a juridical personality, is incapable of satisfying all three requirements. In fact, as repeatedly emphasized in the present case by respondents—as to the first requisite of proclamation, the law requires that a CoP be issued specifically in favor of the nominee who shall be taking a seat in the HoR for the party-list, which must be different from any such certificate that may have been issued to the party-list. It is the CoP in favor of the nominee which works to satisfy the requisite of proclamation under the law.

Further, it is, in fact, the happening of these three requisites which triggers the jurisdiction of the HRET, and consequently divests COMELEC of its own jurisdiction. The case of Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC

75

(Vinzons-Chato), which was also quoted in the instant Petition,

76

is instructive. According to Vinzons-Chato, "once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken [their] oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to [their] election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins."

77

However, emphasis should likewise be made on the fact that the jurisdiction that is transferred to the HRET is not absolute, as shown in

Vinzons-Chato.

What is transferred is not all actions cognizable by COMELEC, and not even all pertaining to the candidate-cum-HoR Member. Only those contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of such Member is transferred. Any other case is retained under COMELEC's jurisdiction, including those pertaining to the Member himself or herself. Clearly, by no stretch of the imagination would the action of cancelling a party-list's registration possibly fall under this classification in

Vinzons-Chato.

Further, the grounds for cancellation under Republic Act No. 7941 pertain to the party-list and not the sitting Member or its nominee/representative. Not only is this distinction clear under the law,

78

but it has also been interpreted by the Court this way. An example is the Court's pronouncement in

Abang Lingkod

when it was ruled that "a declaration of an untruthful statement in a petition for registration under Section 6 (6) of R.A. No. 7941, in order to be a ground for the refusal and/or cancellation of registration under the party-list system,

must pertain to the qualification of the party, organization or coalition under the party-list system."

79

Nowhere in the Constitution, Republic Act No. 7941, or the HRET Rules is the HRET given jurisdiction over party-list organizations. This interpretation is also found in

COCOFED-Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. v. COMELEC,

80

when it ruled in this wise:

Under Section 6(5) of RA No. 7941, violation of or failure to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections is a ground for the cancellation of registration. However, not every kind of violation automatically warrants the cancellation of a party-list group's registration.

Since a reading of the entire Section 6 shows that all the grounds for cancellation actually pertain to the party itself, then the laws, rules and regulations violated to warrant cancellation under Section 6(5) must be one that is primarily imputable to the party itself and not one that is chiefly confined to an individual member or its nominee.

81

(Emphasis supplied)

The distinction between COMELEC's and the HRET's jurisdictions over party-lists and their nominees is, again, emphasized in

Abayon v. HRET,

82

wherein the Court held that, in the case of party-list nominees/representatives, it is the HRET that has jurisdiction over contests relating to their qualifications. Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives.

83

During the deliberations, Justice Javier suggested that as the petition to cancel the registration of An Waray as party-list will necessarily lead to the removal of its then sitting nominee in the HoR—Bem Noel—then the HRET must have jurisdiction; that regardless of the nature of the case, the fact is that its effects will lead to the disqualification of a Member of the HoR.

This is erroneous.

Jurisdiction is conferred by law on the basis of a case's subject matter. A simple reading of the HRET's jurisdiction under the Constitution shows that it is not concerned with the effects of a case, but rather with its subject matter or nature—that is, again, the case must be a contest relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of a Member of the HoR.

The Court cannot give paramount consideration to the effects of a case, over its nature or subject matter, in determining jurisdiction. To see the effects of the cancellation as determinative of which body has the power to make the cancellation is to make the tail wag the dog. That a party-list nominee will cease to be a Member of the HoR because of the cancellation of the party-list's registration does not mean that it is the HRET that has the jurisdiction. Such a view will be contrary to the above-quoted constitutional and statutory provisions empowering COMELEC to be the body to make such a determination.

Such a view will likewise unnecessarily convolute the jurisdiction of the HRET far beyond the limits which the Constitution provides—that is, only over contests relating to election, returns and qualifications of Members of the HoR. Such a view will then place under the HRET's jurisdiction other cases which may remove a sitting Member, even when the resolutions of such cases do not involve the election, returns, and qualifications of the Member. Prime examples of this are criminal or administrative cases which carry the accessory penalties of disqualification from holding public office. To be sure, such accessory penalties are imposed, not by electoral tribunals, but by the courts of justice or other bodies which have jurisdiction over the main administrative or criminal case.

In the landmark

Jalosjos v. COMELEC,

84

the Court held that COMELEC had the positive duty, with or without a petition filed therefor, to cancel the CoC of Romeo G. Jalosjos who was previously convicted by final judgment of

statutory rape and carried the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification under Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

Similarly, in

Ty-Delgado v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal

85

(Ty-Delgado), the Court held that libel is a crime involving moral turpitude which results in the disqualification of a convict to hold public office for five years after his or her service of sentence following Section 12 of the OEC.

In

Ty-Delgado,

there was already a final conviction for four counts of libel by the Court which the HRET failed to consider in disqualifying Philip A. Pichay (Pichay). This was eventually reversed by the Court which declared that Pichay was ineligible to sit as Member of the HoR.

86

It should be emphasized that it was the regular courts that convicted Pichay of libel.

If the Court were to allow the jurisdiction of the HRET to be determined, not by the nature of a case, but by its effects (i.e., whether it can cause the disqualification or removal of a sitting Member of the HoR), then—extreme as it may be—cases such as criminal complaints for statutory rape or libel against sitting Members must be dismissed by a regular court of law in deference to the purported "exclusive" jurisdiction of the HRET over its members. Such notion clearly goes against the tenets of subject matter jurisdiction and even of common sense. Obviously, the ultimate effect of a case in removing a sitting Member cannot be the sole basis for determining jurisdiction. Not only is this conclusion in line with the 1987 Constitution and existing laws, but it also ensures that the proper checks and balances are in place.

An Waray's right to speedy disposition of cases was not violated by COMELEC

An Waray argues for the dismissal of the petition to cancel its registration on the basis that COMELEC violated its right to speedy disposition of cases after having incurred an inordinate delay of four years in resolving the case.

Under the COMELEC Rules, a division of COMELEC has 10 days to resolve a case from the time it is deemed submitted for such resolution, whereas the COMELEC

En Banc

has 30 days to resolve a motion for reconsideration of such a division's decision, reckoned also from the time that the case is deemed submitted for decision. Here, the petition to cancel An Waray's party-list registration was filed in May of 2019. The COMELEC Division granted the same in June of 2023, and the COMELEC

En Banc

, later in August 2023, affirmed its Division on motion for reconsideration.

Thus, there is no denying that COMELEC did, in fact, incur in delay of almost four years in resolving the petition.

Despite this delay, during the deliberations for this case, Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan (Justice Gaerlan), citing the landmark case of

Cagang v. Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division, Quezon City

87

(Cagang),

opined that there was no violation of An Waray's right to a speedy disposition of cases. Justice Gaerlan cited the following factors in arriving at such conclusion: 1) An Waray had waived its right to speedy disposition of cases as it failed to raise the same in the four years that the case was pending with COMELEC; and 2) the delay caused no actual prejudice to petitioners as even after the petition was filed and remained pending in 2019 and 2022, An Waray was still able to participate, and, in fact, was still able to win seats in the HoR in both election years.

The Court agrees that there was no violation of An Waray's right to speedy disposition of cases despite the four-year delay of COMELEC in resolving the petition to cancel An Waray's party-list registration. This conclusion is stronger in the context of the nature of the case filed against An Waray being one of an administrative nature

vis-a-vis

the criminal case involved in

Cagang.

The Court in

Cagang

clarified the distinction between the two rights involved under Sections 14(2) and 16 of the Constitution, namely: (1) Right to Speedy Trial; and (2) Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases. According to the Court:

[T]he right to speedy disposition of cases is different from the right to speedy trial. While the rationale for both rights is the same, the right to speedy trial may only be invoked in criminal prosecutions against courts of law. The right to speedy disposition of cases, however, may be invoked before any tribunal, whether judicial or quasi-judicial. What is important is that the accused may already be prejudiced by the proceeding for the right to speedy disposition of cases to be invoked.

88

Cagang

likewise recognized that, apart from criminal cases, the right to speedy disposition of cases also applies to administrative cases before any tribunal, but qualifies such administrative cases as those

which are adversarial

and

may result in criminal prosecution,

to wit:

While the right to speedy trial is invoked against courts of law,

the right to speedy disposition of cases may be invoked before quasi-judicial or administrative tribunals in proceedings that are adversarial and may result in possible criminal liability.

The right to speedy disposition of cases is most commonly invoked in fact-finding investigations and preliminary investigations by the Office of the Ombudsman since neither of these proceedings form part of the actual criminal prosecution.

89

(Emphasis supplied)

As recognized in the preceding paragraph, these cases or matters include preliminary investigations by the Office of the Ombudsman

90

or by the various prosecutor's offices. In fact, a perusal of the guidelines set forth in

Cagang

suggests that its application might even be limited to criminal proceedings, either at the preliminary investigation stage or criminal cases already filed in court, to wit:

First,

the right to speedy disposition of cases is different from the right to speedy trial. While the rationale for both rights is the same, the right to speedy trial may only be invoked in criminal prosecutions against courts of law. The right to speedy disposition of cases, however, may be invoked before any tribunal, whether judicial or quasi-judicial.

What is important is that the accused may already be prejudiced by the proceeding for the right to speedy disposition of cases to be invoked.

Second, a case is deemed initiated upon the filing of a formal complaint prior to a conduct of a preliminary investigation.

This Court acknowledges, however, that the Ombudsman should set reasonable periods for preliminary investigation, with due regard to the complexities and nuances of each case. Delays beyond this period will be taken against the prosecution.

The period taken for fact-finding investigations prior to the filing of the formal complaint shall not be included in the determination of whether there has been inordinate delay.

Third,

courts must first determine which party carries the burden of proof. If the right is invoked within the given time periods contained in current Supreme Court resolutions and circulars, and the time periods that will be promulgated by the Office of the Ombudsman, the defense has the burden of proving that the right was justifiably invoked. If the delay occurs beyond the given time period and the right is invoked,

the prosecution has the burden of justifying the delay.

If the defense has the burden of proof, it must prove first, whether the case is motivated by malice or clearly only politically motivated and is attended by utter lack of evidence, and second, that the defense did not contribute to the delay.

Once the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution,

the prosecution must prove first, that it followed the prescribed procedure in the conduct of preliminary investigation and in the prosecution of the case; second,

that the complexity of the issues and the volume of evidence made the delay inevitable; and

third,

that no prejudice was suffered by the accused as a result of the delay.

Fourth,

determination of the length of delay is never mechanical. Courts must consider the entire context of the case, from the amount of evidence to be weighed to the simplicity or complexity of the issues raised.

An exception to this rule is if there is an allegation that the prosecution of the case was solely motivated by malice, such as when the case is politically motivated or when there is continued prosecution despite utter lack of evidence. Malicious intent may be gauged from the behavior of the prosecution throughout the proceedings. If malicious prosecution is properly alleged and substantially proven, the case would automatically be dismissed without need of further analysis of the delay.

Another exception would be the waiver of the accused to the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial. If it can be proven that the accused acquiesced to the delay, the constitutional right can no longer be invoked.

In all cases of dismissals due to inordinate delay, the causes of the delays must be properly laid out and discussed by the relevant court.

Fifth,

the right to speedy disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial must be timely raised.

The respondent or the accused must file the appropriate motion upon the lapse of the statutory or procedural periods.

Otherwise, they are deemed to have waived their right to speedy disposition of cases.

91

(Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)

Thus, even as

Cagang

categorically acknowledged the application of the right to speedy disposition of cases in administrative cases, it nonetheless focused only on such administrative cases that can result in criminal indictments.

A purely administrative case that tackled this right is

Abella v. Commission on Audit Proper

92

(

Abella

), a case which involved the disallowances of extraordinary and miscellaneous expenses, where the Court emphasized therein the need to allege and prove that the party invoking the right must have suffered an actual, specific, and real injury for the claim of violation of such right to prosper, thus:

Moreover,

petitioners failed to seasonably question the violation of their right to speedy disposition, if at all. Throughout the proceedings before the COA Regional Office and the COA Proper, petitioners never asserted their right. They could have filed a manifestation or a motion for early resolution of their case before the COA Regional Office, or invoked their right before the COA Proper on appeal, but did not do so.

Instead, in a last-ditch attempt to seek a favorable resolution, petitioners raise this alleged constitutional violation for the first time in this petition. Certainly, this lapse deprived the COA of the opportunity to address the issue and beclouded petitioners' invocation of inordinate delay. We emphasize that the right to speedy disposition of cases is not a last line of remedy when parties find themselves on the losing end of the proceedings.

. . .

[T]he sheer length of time, without allegation and proof of prejudice to the party invoking the right, does not equate to an inordinate delay to justify the nullification of the COA Proper issuances.

The right to speedy disposition of cases is not a magical invocation that can automatically compel courts or any justice-administering agency to rule in one's favor.

To sustain a violation of this right, there must be an actual, specific, and real injury to the claimant's rights as a result of the delay, not mere conjectural supplications of prejudice or generalized invocation of the constitutional right. A claim of prejudice, if at all, must have a conclusive and factual basis.

93

(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

A comparison of

Cagang

and

Abella

shows a contrast on the degree of strictness that the Court observed in deciding whether a claim for violation of one's right to speedy disposition of cases can prosper. Specifically, Abella went as far as requiring an actual, specific, and real injury to the claimant's right which, further, must have conclusive and factual basis. Such requirement does not obtain in

Cagang.

Thus,

Abella

appears to have set a higher standard in proving such violation than

Cagang.

This differential treatment between criminal cases and others, including administrative cases,

vis-a-vis

proving a violation of one's right to speedy disposition of cases becomes logical when one investigates the rationale behind this right as applied to criminal cases—that is, it seeks to prevent the oppressive nature of criminal cases from looming indefinitely over the respondent. In

Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan,

94

the Court pronounced:

The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case against him was

designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the administration of justice by mandating the courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases.

Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. The inquiry as to whether or not an accused has been denied such right is not susceptible by precise qualification. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.

95

(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Indeed, criminal proceedings are a class of its own in light of the highly burdensome effects it imposes upon the person being investigated or indicted. One faces the terrifying possibility of arrest and detention, even pending resolution of the case. In addition, pending criminal cases normally appear in an individual's records that can greatly hamper his or her employability or besmirch his career or profession.

The Court has likewise recognized that criminal prosecution can validly impair one's right to travel;

96

in fact, a precautionary hold departure order can already be issued even before a formal indictment.

97

On a social level, a criminal complaint lodged against one, of and by itself, and even in the absence of a conviction, already creates a stigma which subjects the person to humiliation and ridicule. All told, criminal prosecution, prior to a case filed in court, damages a person's reputation to a level that can substantially prejudice him or her psychologically, socially, and economically.

Considering these factors, it is but reasonable that the Constitution more vigorously guard the people against the State's delay in criminal proceedings as compared to other types of cases. The grave effects of a long-standing preliminary investigation, for example, does not apply to purely administrative cases, such as the one at hand. To stress, the petition to cancel An Waray's registration as a party-list organization is not tantamount to a criminal prosecution. There are no rights of an accused on the line, and the toll upon the respondent of a pending administrative case is nowhere near as inimical as a long-standing criminal prosecution.

It appears, thus, that the need to distinguish as to the nature of a case vis-à-vis granting a claim of violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases boils down to the evils which the right seeks to prevent. In criminal cases, an accused or respondent need not show actual injury because the restrictions and limitations on fundamental rights come with the indictment and investigation as shown above. The same, however, cannot be said for administrative cases—thus, for a claimant to successfully hurdle a claim of violation of this right, it is imperative to prove actual injury caused by the purported delay as elucidated in

Abella.

On this point, the Court agrees with Justice Gaerlan—An Waray utterly failed to show any prejudice or injury that resulted from the pendency of the petition with COMELEC. In fact, during this period, An Waray participated in and won the elections, thus securing a seat in the present Congress.

Further, considering that in administrative cases such as the one at hand, the burden is placed on the party invoking the right to prove its violation, and considering the evils of an administrative case compared to criminal cases, the Court likewise holds, as pointed out by Justice Gaerlan, that An Waray's own delay in invoking its right is tantamount to waiver or acquiescence to COMELEC's delay on the part of An Waray.

The petition to cancel An Waray's party-list registration has not prescribed under Section 267 of the OEC because this law applies only to election offenses.

Petitioners allege that the action to cancel An Waray's party-list registration had already prescribed in accordance with Section 267 of the OEC, which reads:

SECTION 267.

Prescription. — Election offenses shall prescribe after five years from the date of their commission.

If the discovery of the offense be made in an election contest proceedings, the period of prescription shall commence on the date on which the judgment in such proceedings becomes final and executory. (

Sec. 185, Id.

) (Emphasis supplied)

Notably, Sections 261 and 262 of the OEC specify the acts which constitute an election offense. A perusal of the said provisions in the OEC shows that a petition to cancel a party-list's registration is not among the acts considered as an election offense. In statutory construction, the express mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all others. The rule is expressed in the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Indubitably, the petition to cancel An Waray's registration has not prescribed under Section 267 of the OEC as it is not an election offense.

(awÞhi(

Moreover, Republic Act No. 7941—the main law governing the party-list system in the Philippines—is silent as to the period of filing of a petition to cancel party-list registration. So is the COMELEC Rules.

Neither can petitioners find refuge in the New Civil Code, specifically Article 1149 thereof, which provides:

ART. 1149. All other actions whose periods are not fixed in this Code or in other laws must be brought within five years from the time the right of action accrues. (n)

Article 1149 of the New Civil Code is inapplicable in this case. As held in

Spouses Edralin v. Philippine Veterans Bank,

98

this provision refers to prescription of actions. An action is "defined as an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which one party prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong."

99

The petition to cancel An Waray's party-list registration is clearly not an ordinary action filed in court for Article 1149 to apply.

In

Dayao v. COMELEC

100

(

Dayao

), the Court likened an accreditation or registration of an organization under the party-list law to a franchise granted by the Congress, in that it is not a right but merely a privilege that is conferred by the granting authority—COMELEC in the case of registration of party-lists. Such organizations become juridical entities only when they are granted registration or accreditation. Relevant to the question of prescription, the Court in

Dayao

likewise declared that, like a congressional franchise, an accreditation or registration can never become final or irrevocable, and the granting authority can always review the accreditation it extended and revoke the same at will, thus:

Each accreditation handed by the COMELEC to party-list organizations can be likened to the franchise granted by Congress, thru the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), to corporations or associations created under the Corporation Code.

Franchise is a right or privilege conferred by law. It emanates from a sovereign power and the grant is inherently a legislative power.

It may, however, be derived indirectly from the state through an agency to which the power has been clearly and validly delegated. In such cases, Congress prescribes the conditions on which the grant of a franchise may be made.

The power to pass upon, refuse or deny the application for registration of any corporation or partnership is vested with the SEC by virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 902-A. R.A. No. 7941, on the other hand, is the legislative act that delegates to the COMELEC the power to grant franchises in the form of accreditation to people's organization desirous of participating in the party-list system of representation.

Corporations formed under the Corporation Code become juridical entities only when they are granted registration by the SEC in the same way that people's organizations obtain legal existence as a party-list group only upon their accreditation with the COMELEC.

A party-list organization, like a corporation, owes its legal existence to the concession of its franchise from the State, thru the COMELEC.

Being a mere concession, it may be revoked by the granting authority upon the existence of certain conditions. The power to revoke and grounds for revocation are aptly provided in Section 6(1) of P.D. No. 902-A, for corporations and Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 for party-list organizations.

The fact that a franchise/accreditation may be revoked means that it can never be final and conclusive. A fortiori, the factual findings leading to the grant of the franchise/accreditation can never attain finality as well. Both the accreditation and the facts substantiating it can never attain perpetual and irrefutable conclusiveness as against the power that grants it. The circumstances of the grantee are subject to constant review and the franchise/accreditation from which it derives its existence may be suspended or revoked at the will of the granting authority.

101

(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Indeed, Republic Act No. 7941 expressly recognizes COMELEC's power to review and cancel registrations it already extended to party-list groups. That it does not limit the exercise of this power to a specific period means that, consistent with the rationale in Dayao, it can exercise the same at any time. In short, it does not prescribe.

COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it cancelled An Waray's registration as a party-list.

Having settled that COMELEC properly exercised jurisdiction over the petition to cancel An Waray's party-list registration, and that such action did not, as it does not, prescribe, the only issue left to settle at this point is whether COMELEC, in exercising its jurisdiction over the case, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of such jurisdiction.

It did not.

To recall, An Waray's party-list registration was cancelled by COMELEC on the basis of Section 6(5) of Republic Act No. 7941, which provides as a ground for such cancellation any violation of, or failure to comply with, laws, rules or regulations relating to elections committed by a registered party-list. COMELEC found that An Waray's act of aiding or, at the very least, allowing Victoria to assume a second seat in the 16th Congress back in 2013, despite knowledge that it was only entitled to one seat and that Victoria was, in fact, not proclaimed by COMELEC, constituted a violation of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 7941, which reads:

SEC. 13.

How Party-List Representatives are Chosen.

– Party-list representatives shall be proclaimed by the COMELEC based on the list of names submitted by the respective parties, organizations, or coalitions to the COMELEC according to their ranking in said list.

As to this point, the Court finds COMELEC to have erred. A simple reading of the provision shows that it is a directive to COMELEC itself to proclaim the winning party-list representatives according to their rankings in the list of names submitted by such party-lists. Being that the provision speaks of COMELEC's duty and responsibility to make such proclamation, it defies logic to find An Waray to have violated or failed to comply with the same. Again, it was not its responsibility to obtain such proclamation under Section 13. Its failure to do so cannot be regarded as a violation of this section.

Nevertheless, An Waray did commit a violation of, or a failure to comply with, a law, thus warranting the cancellation of its party-list registration. The law is NBOC Resolution No. 13-030 (PL)/0004-14 which, applying

BANAT

, clearly and unequivocally declared the number of seats that An Waray was entitled to—ONE:

Applying the Banat formula using Party-List Canvass Report No. 11, after deducting the votes for the disqualified party-list groups, but maintaining the votes for SENIOR CITIZENS in view of the pendency of its case before the Supreme Court, and the votes for ABANG LINGKOD considering the reversal of the cancellation of its registration by the Supreme Court, the computation shows that PBA is not entitled to a party-list seat. To illustrate:

Rank

Party-List

Votes Garnered as of 28 May 2013

% of Votes Garnered (A)

Guaranteed Seats (1st Round) (B)

Additional Seat (2nd Round) = (58-14) (A)

Total Seats

. . . .

15

AN WARAY

541,205

1.96

N.A.

0.86

1

102

Despite notice of such resolution indicating that it secured only one seat in the HoR after the 2013 NLE, An Waray

continued

to occupy a second seat through Victoria until the end of her term. This was a clear defiance of NBOC Resolution No. 13-030 (PL)/0004-14 in relation to Section 6(5) of Republic Act No. 7941.

Other factors also show An Waray's lack of penitence leading to its violation of NBOC Resolution No. 13-030 (PL)/0004-14.

First,

NBOC Resolution No. 0008-13 expressly stated that the declaration of seats allocated to the party-list groups mentioned (which included An Waray which was then allocated two seats) was

"without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations or coalitions which may later on be established to be entitled to one guaranteed seat and/or additional seat[.]"

103

True enough, NBOC Resolution No. 13-030 (PL)/0004-14 was thereafter issued and the same recomputed and finally allocated to An Waray only ONE seat.

Second,

An Waray knew that it lacked Victoria's CoP and that the same was necessary for her to become a Member of the HoR. An Waray, in fact, wrote COMELEC a letter-request for a CoP, proclaiming Victoria as being entitled to a seat in the HoR:

"I am writing in behalf of the AN WARAY Party-List and this is in connection with the Certification of Proclamation being issued by your good office to the nominees of the Proclaimed Party-List Groups. We have been informed that insofar as concerns the AN WARAY Party-List you will issue said Certification in favor of Mr. Neil Benedict A. Montejo only, our first nominee.

In this regard, may we point out that on May 28, 2013, the Commission (sitting as National Board of Canvassers) promulgated NBOC Resolution No. 0008-13 and proclaimed the AN WARAY Party-List as one of the winners in the Party-list elections entitled to Two (2) seats.

Thus, we are respectfully requesting that the Second nominee of AN WARAY, Atty. Victoria G. Noel, be likewise issued a Certification of Proclamation. This request is being made also in order that she can get a room assignment, organize her staff and more importantly, be able to obtain Committee memberships in furtherance of the legislative agenda of the AN WARAY Party-List.["]

104

(Emphasis in the original)

An Waray's letter belies its argument that NBOC Resolution No. 0008-13 was sufficient for Victoria to take her oath and assume office. In fact, the letter reveals that An Waray was aware that a CoP was necessary for Victoria to assume office and perform the duties of a congresswoman, such as organizing her staff and obtaining committee memberships. Yet, despite the absence of the CoP, Victoria took her oath and assumed office. An Waray's audacity in deliberately ignoring NBOC Resolution No. 13-030 (PL)/0004-14 was solidified when it chose to let Victoria finish her term despite the unequivocal wording of the said NBOC Resolution.

Conclusion

In sum, the petition for cancellation of An Waray's registration is within COMELEC's sole and exclusive jurisdiction under the Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941. It is not a case that falls under the HRET's jurisdiction; thus, even as An Waray had an incumbent nominee in the HoR when the petition against it was filed, and which nominee was at risk of being removed as a consequence of said petition, COMELEC nonetheless retained jurisdiction.

Moreover, when COMELEC exercised its jurisdiction and cancelled the registration of An Waray for violating or failing to comply with election laws, it did so without grave abuse of its discretion. An Waray knowingly and deliberately allowed, and consciously aided, the assumption of Victoria as its second nominee in the HoR, despite its knowledge that Victoria lacked a CoP from COMELEC. Thus, COMELEC was correct in cancelling An Waray's registration.

Anent the issue of the violation of An Waray's right to speedy disposition of cases, this does not arise since the present case is merely administrative in nature, and not criminal. Based on jurisprudence and the language of the Constitution, the rules for determining a violation of this right by the State in criminal proceedings, which are meant to protect the rights of the accused, cannot apply in a purely administrative case such as the one at hand. Applying stricter parameters in the determination of the right's violation in the present case, the Court finds that there is no such violation committed by COMELEC.

Finally, there can be no prescription of the action to cancel the registration of An Waray, as the same is akin to a legislative franchise which never gains finality or conclusiveness because the granting authority can always review and revoke the same.

ACCORDINGLY

, the Petition for

Certiorari

is

DISMISSED

. The Urgent Prayer for Preliminary Injunction, Temporary Restraining Order and/or Status

Quo Ante

Order with Motion for Conduct of Special Raffle under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is likewise

DENIED

. The assailed Resolution dated June 2, 2023 of the Commission on Elections Second Division and Resolution dated August 14, 2023 of the Commission on Elections

En Banc

in SPP No. 19-008 are hereby

AFFIRMED

.

SO ORDERED.

Gesmundo, C.J., Hernando, Inting, Zalameda, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, Marquez, Kho, Jr., and Singh, JJ., concur.

Leonen, SAJ., concur. See separate opinion.

Lazaro-Javier,

*

J., see dissent. On official business but left a vote.

Footnotes

•

Also referred to as Danilo T. Pornias in some parts of the rollo.

*

On official business.

1

Rollo,

pp. 3-88.

2

Id.

at 89-103. The June 2, 2023 Resolution in SPP No. 19-008 was signed by Presiding Commissioner Marlon S. Casquejo and Commissioners Rey E. Bulay and Nelson J. Celis of the COMELEC Second Division.

3

Id.

at 104-113. The August 14, 2023 Resolution in SPP No. 19-008 was signed by Chairman George Erwin M. Garcia and Commissioners Socorro B. Inting, Marlon S. Casquejo, Aimee P. Ferolino, Rey E. Bulay, Ernesto Ferdinand P. Maceda, Jr. (with Separate Opinion, id. at 114-128), and Nelson J. Celis of the COMELEC

En Banc

.

4

Id.

at 89, 105.

5

Id.

at 90.

6

Id.

at 546-547.

7

Id.

at 175-177.

8

Id.

at 176.

9

Id.

at 9 and 90. A copy of the Minute Resolution No. 13-0885 was reproduced in the Separate Opinion of Commissioner Ernesto Ferdinand P. Maceda, Jr. which indicates that the resignation of Acidre was only received by the COMELEC Law Department on May 29, 2013.

10

Id.

at 91. The Certification relevantly reads:

We, the Chairman and Commissioners of the Commission on Elections, sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers for Party-List Representatives, do hereby proclaim

AN WARAY

as winner in the party-list elections of May 13, 2013 to entitle its nominee, namely:

NEIL BENEDICT A. MONTEJO

to sit as representative to the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines, and to serve for a term of three (3) years, ending June 30, 2016, in accordance with Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution.

11

Id.

at 10, 96, and 202.

12

Id.

13

Id.

at 549-550.

14

Id.

at 91.

15

720 Phil. 120 (2013) [Per J. Reyes,

En Banc

].

16

Id.

at 145-146.

17

604 Phil. 131 (2009) [Per J. Carpio,

En Banc

].

18

Rollo,

pp. 91-92. The Resolution relevantly provides:

Applying the Banat formula using Party-List Canvass Report No. 11, after deducting the votes for the disqualified party-list groups, but maintaining the votes for SENIOR CITIZENS in view of the pendency of its case before the Supreme Court, and the votes for ABANG LINGKOD considering the reversal of the cancellation of its registration by the Supreme Court, the computation shows that PBA is not entitled to a party-list seat. To illustrate:

Rank

Party-List

Votes Garnered as of 28 May 2013

% of Votes Garnered (A)

Guaranteed Seat (1st Round) (B)

Additional Seat (2nd Round) = (58-14) (A)

Total Seats

. . . .

15

AN WARAY

541,205

1.96

N.A.

0.86

1

19

Id.

at 178-198.

20

An Act Providing for the Election of Party-List Representatives Through the Party-List System, and Appropriating Funds Therefor (1995).

21

Rollo,

pp. 185-188.

22

Id.

at 197.

23

SEC. 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. – The COMELEC may,

motu proprio

or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration or any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:

. . . .

(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections[.] (Emphasis supplied)

24

Rollo,

pp. 188-189.

25

Id.

at 200-209.

26

Id.

at 203.

27

See id. at 204-205.

28

Id.

at 103.

29

Id.

at 100.

30

Id.

at 101-103.

31

Id.

at 112.

32

SEC. 13. How Party-List Representatives are Chosen. – Party-list representatives shall be proclaimed by the COMELEC based on the list of names submitted by the respective parties, organizations, or coalitions to the COMELEC according to their ranking in said list.

33

See

rollo,

pp. 111-112.

34

Id.

at 43.

35

Id.

at 55.

36

SECTION 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on

certiorari

by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.

37

SECTION 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.

38

Rollo,

pp. 61-65.

39

Id.

at 64-65.

40

See id. at 60.

41

SECTION 267. Prescription. — Election offenses shall prescribe after five years from the date of their commission. If the discovery of the offense be made in an election contest proceedings, the period of prescription shall commence on the date on which the judgment in such proceedings becomes final and executory.

42

Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (1985).

43

Rollo,

pp. 65-66.

44

Id.

at 67-70.

45

Id.

at 471-A-471-B.

46

Id.

at 517-545.

47

Id.

at 530.

48

Id.

at 531-533.

49

Id.

at 537-538.

50

Id.

at 538.

51

Id.

at 538-540.

52

Id.

at 592-596.

53

Id.

at 618-619.

54

Id.

at 627-630.

55

Id.

at 631-632.

56

Id.

at 632-634.

57

Id.

at 585 and 701-703.

58

Id.

at 706-715.

59

Id.

at 724-759.

60

Id.

at 743-744.

61

Id.

at 807-821.

62

People v. Montilla,

G.R. Nos. 241911 & 242375, February 8, 2023 [Per J. Singh, Third Division] at 8. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the Decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.

63

COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE, Rule 25, sec. 3 provides:

SECTION 3. Period to File Petition. — The petition shall be filed any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation.

64

Before the start of the Campaign Period which is 90 to 15 days, depending on the position sought.

65

Section 78 of the OEC provides:

SECTION 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. — A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.

66

Under the Omnibus Election Code, it cannot be beyond the start of the Campaign Period, which, in turn, is set on a per candidate basis but the longest is 90 days. (OEC, Sec. 3)

67

See CONST., art. VI, sec. 4.

68

THE 2015 REVISED RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (2015).

69

228 Phil. 193 (1986) [Per J. Cruz,

En Banc

].

70

Id.

at 205-206.

71

661 Phil. 452 (2011) [Per J. Peralta,

En Banc

].

72

Id.

at 462.

73

Id.

at 461-462.

74

See

Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC

, 548 Phil. 712 (2007) [Per J. Callejo, Sr.,

En Banc

].

75

Id.

76

Rollo,

pp. 32-35.

77

Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC, supra

note 74, at 725-726. (Citation omitted)

78

Republic Act No. 7941 (1995), sec. 6.

79

Abang Lingkod Party List v. COMELEC, supra

note 15, at 143. (Emphasis supplied)

80

716 Phil. 19 (2013) [Per J. Brion,

En Banc

].

81

Id.

at 30.

82

626 Phil. 346 (2010) [Per J. Abad,

En Banc

].

83

Id.

at 352 as cited in

ABC (Alliance for Barangay Concerns) Party List v. COMELEC, supra

note 71, at 462.

84

711 Phil. 414 (2013) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe,

En Banc

].

85

779 Phil. 268 (2016) [Per J. Carpio,

En Banc

].

86

Id.

at 286-287.

87

837 Phil. 815 (2018) [Per J. Leonen,

En Banc

].

88

Id.

at 880.

89

Id.

at 849.

90

Id.

91

Id.

at 880-882.

92

G.R. No. 238940, April 19, 2022 [Per J. M. Lopez,

En Banc

].

93

Id.

at 6-7. This pinpoint citation refers to the copy of the Decision uploaded to the Supreme Court website.

94

484 Phil. 899 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division].

95

Id.

at 917.

96

Pichay, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division),

903 Phil. 271 (2021) [Per J. Delos Santos, Third Division].

97

A.M. No. 18-07-05-SC, Rule on Precautionary Hold Departure Order (2018), secs. 1 and 2.

98

660 Phil. 368 (2011) [Per J. Del Castillo, First Division].

99

Id.

at 386. (Citation omitted)

100

702 Phil. 348 (2013) [Per J. Reyes,

En Banc

].

101

Id.

at 370-371.

102

Rollo,

pp. 91-92.

103

Id.

at 601. (Emphasis supplied)

104

Id.

at 549.

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