G.R. No. 208284 (2018)

[WHETHER] THE [CA] SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE APPEAL DESPITE (1) CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF THE PETITIONER : AND] (2) FAILURE OF THE RESPONDENT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE ON THEIR CLAIM THAT PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT RELIGIOUS CORPORATION IS ONE CANDI THE SAME ORGANIZATION[.]

[WHETHER) THE [CA] SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE APPEAL CONTRARY TO THE WELL-ISETTLED RULE THAT A VALIDLY ISSUED TORRENS CERTIFICATE OF TITLE CANNOT BE THE SUBJECT OF COLLATERAL ATTACK[.]

WHETHER THE CA] SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT [GALVEZ] (REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PETITIONER) [VOLUNTARILY] VACATED THE SUBJECT LOT WHEN RESPONDENT FILED AN EJECTMENT CASEI X X X26

Petitioner's Arguments

In its Petition,27 Reply,28 and Memorandum,29 petitioner argues that it is the true, absolute, and registered owner of the disputed property, which is covered by OCT No. (8257) M-35266 and TD No. 06223; that its President, Galvez, is in possession of the owner's duplicate copy of OCT (8257) M-35266; that being the registered owner of the disputed property, it has the right to possess, enjoy, dispose of the same, and to initiate the appropriate action to recover the same under Article 428 of the Civil Code, as in the instant case, that it filed the action for unlawful detainer against respondents in accordance with Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court; that respondents' right to the possession of the disputed property, was through mere tolerance, and expired upon receipt of its demand for them to vacate the same through a letter dated February 12, 2007; that the date of unlawful deprivation is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate; that respondents' continued possession of the disputed property has become unlawful, warranting their ejectment therefrom; that Dela Cruz's failure to present the original duplicate copy of the title which she alleged to be in respondents' possession, negated such claim; that Dela Cruz's allegation that petitioner is the same as Obispo Representante at Pastor General ng Iglesia ni Jesukristo "Bagong Jerusalem" Inc. is false, because the latter's SEC Certificate of Incorporation clearly showed that it was another entity; that it could not comprehend why the RTC mentioned that the originals of the SEC Certificate of Incorporation and AOI of Obispo Representante at Pastor General ng Iglesia ni Jesukristo "Bagong Jerusalem" Inc. as well as the original copy of the title in respondents' possession were presented before the MeTC, although these were not in fact presented before the court; and that despite respondents' failure to present the original documents to prove that the Church of Jesus Christ and the Iglesia ni Jesu Kristo "Bagong Jerusalem" Inc. were one and the same organization, the MeTC, RTC, and CA all still erroneously found that they are one and the same organization.

Petitioner further contends that respondents can be prosecuted for perjury for falsely claiming that the ejectment case was dismissed because Galvez in point of fact voluntarily vacated the disputed property; that Dela Cruz even paid attorney's fees to Galvez pursuant to said judgment; that while it may be true that some of the defendants in the ejectment case vacated the disputed property, Galvez did not vacate the disputed property, and in fact still resides there, hence, the CA's finding that Galvez vacated the disputed property is contrary to the evidence; that petitioner even fiied a motion for execution with respect to the award of costs of suit in the amount of ₱10,000.00 and Dela Cruz even paid that award, as evidenced by a temporary receipt; and that what was merely stated in the MeTC Decision in the ejectment case was that the demand letter by registered mail to Galvez was returned to sender "with the notation that the addressee had moved already."

Petitioner moreover insists that as the instant case is only for unlawful detainer, it follows that the only issue to be resolved pertains to who has a better right to the possession of the disputed property, independent of any claim of ownership or possession de jure; that in view of the existence of the validly issued title in its name, there is no need to determine the issue of ownership at all; that ii is settled that a person who has a Torrens Title over the property is entitled to the possession thereof; that it had complied with all the requirements for the institution of an unlawful detainer case under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Civil Procedure; that the date of the filing of the Complaint on March 28, 2007 is within one year from the date of the final demand letter dated February 12, 2007; that respondents obstinately refused to surrender the possession of the disputed property, despite its demand; that Galvez was in peaceful possession of the disputed property until Dela Cruz filed the ejectment case, hence he was prompted to "fix" the documentation in 1999; and that he (Galvez) is now 94 years old, and has been residing at the disputed property since birth, hence its late registration should not be adjudged against him (Galvez).

Petitioner likewise argues that Dela Cruz's defense, which was upheld by the CA, that the petitioner and the Obispo Representante at Pastor General ng Iglesia ni JesuKristo "Bagong Jerusalem" Inc. are one and the same organization, is a collateral attack upon the title validly issued to it, which is proscribed by Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529; that respondents did not resort to any legal action to annui or cancel the title issued to it; and that it was error for the CA to conclude that respondents' claim of ownership is better than petitioner's title.

Petitioner thus prays that the CA Decision and Resolution be set aside, and that judgment be rendered ordering Dela Cruz and all persons claiming rights under her to vacate the subject property; to pay petitioner monthly rent of ₱20,000.00 or reasonable compensation therefor as well as ₱50,000.00 in exemplary damages; ₱50,000.00 in attorney's fees plus ₱3,000.00 per hearing; and to pay the costs of suit.

Respondents' Arguments

In her Comment30 and Memorandum,31 Dela Cruz counters that the records before the MeTC clearly showed that the original AOI was presented and marked; that if she and her co-respondents indeed failed to present the original AOI of the religious corporation that they belonged to, then petitioner should have made a comment thereon or requested for the correction of the Preliminary Conference Order to reflect such facts; and, that both the MeTC and the RTC made the finding that Dela Cruz presented the original document,

More than these, Dela Cruz argues that petitioner's title was obtained only because Dela Cruz filed an action or motion for the issuance of a reconstituted copy allegedly because the original title had been lost although it was not in fact lost; and that above all, the MeTC itself adverted to petitioner's declaration before the SEC that it does not in fact own any real property, whether land or building.

Our Ruling

This Court finds no merit in the present Petition.

We start off with the basic postulate that the present case was a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages by petitioner against respondents. The requirements for such an ejectment suit are fundamental, thus:

x x x Section 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended x x x states:

SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when - Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.

x x x x

A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following: (i) the defendant's initial possession of the property was lawful, either by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon the plaintiff's notice to the defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment of the property; and (4) the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment within one (1) year from the last demand to vacate the property.32

In this case, the MeTC, the RTC, and the CA ruled for respondents, by uniformly holding that Dela Cruz was able to show by convincing evidence that she is the duly authorized representative of the registered owner of the disputed property. Quoting the RTC, the CA agreed that it is beyond doubt or dispute that the disputed property is registered in the name of "The Iglesia de Jesucristo, Jerusalem Nueva of Manila, Philippines, Inc." and that the sole issue for resolution in the case is which party was authorized to represent the registered owner of the disputed property, viz.:

Indeed, the totality of evidence presented by the parties tilts in favor of [Dela Cruz]. We quote with approval the [RTC's) ratiocinations X X X:

Х Х Х Х

There is no question that the subject [lot] is registered in the name of "Iglesia de Jesucristo, Jerusalem Nueva of Manila, Philippines', ([‘]Nueva de Manila' for brevity) in 1940, [Galvez] argued that he is the president of Nueva de Manila hence, authorized to represent the same; likewise, [Dela Cruz] as an officer of Church of Jesus Christ, New Jerusalem' ("New Jerusalem for brevity) claims the same representation as Nueva de Manila' and 'New Jerusalem' are one and the same entity.

The only issue to be resolved is who as between [Galvez] and [Dela Cruz] is authorized to represent the registered owner of the subject property. X X X

The Court notes that as stated in [Galvez's] [C]omplaint (par. 4) his religious organization, ‘Nueva [de] Manila', of which he represents was organized way back in 1940; but why is it that Galvez registered it only in 1999? On the other hands, "Bagong Jerusalem which also bears the name of New Jerusalem' in its English (translation and Jerusalem Nueva' in its Spanish translation was registered in 1955 as a corporation sole with Rev. Pineda as the Bishop Representative and General Pastor of the church and not [Rosendo], the founder as (Galvez] claimed x x x. (Galvez failed to explain this glaring inconsistency, which render[ed] his evidence not worthy of credence.

x x x x

x x x [T]he Court finds that 'Nueva de Manila appearing as the registered owner of the subject property and ‘Bagong Jerusalem, the registered name of the religious organization of [Dela Cruz] which is also known as New Jerusalem' in its English translation are one and she same organization, and Dela Cruz), as evidenced by a Secretary's Certificate X X X was authorized to represent [the same]. The [pieces of] evidence of [Dela Cruz] are found to be more preponderant, the same being consistent and more credible and therefore, more plausible than that of [Galvez's pieces of] evidence which are inconsistent, doubtful[,] and implausible.33

It is beyond cavil that the disputed property is registered in the name of "The Iglesia de Jesucristo, Jerusalem Nueva of Manila, Philippines, Inc." as stated in both the reconstituted title34 attached to the Complaint submitted by petitioner, as represented by Galvez, as well as in the copy of the original title35 thereof attached to the Position Paper filed by Dela Cruz, which as claimed by the latter is in the possession of Obispo Representante at Pastor General ng Iglesia ni Jesukristo "Bagong Jerusalem" Inc.1âwphi1 We note that this name is actually the name of petitioner verbatim. Moreover, it is indicated in the dorsal portion of the reconstituted title that Galvez had been authorized to prosecute the action to reconstitute the title, to wit:

Entry No. 77467/OCT (8257)35266-AFFIDAVIT OF LOSS-Executed by [Galvez] in his capacity as the president of the Iglesia De Jesucristo, Jerusalem Nueva of Manila, Philippines, Inc., that the Certificate of Owners [D]uplicate of Title No. 8257 had been lost, misplaced struck by flood unknown to him.

Date of Instrument: 06-08-06

Date of Inscription: 06-09-06

(SGD) JOSEPHINE H. PONCIANO
Actg. Reg. of Deeds

Entry No. 79998-99/T-No. (8257)M-35266: COURT ORDER ISSUANCE OF

NEW OWNERS CERT. OF TITLE:

ISSUING AUTHORITY: Branch 170/City of Malabon

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS: LRC CASE NO.958-MN

Date of Instrument: Sept. 30, [2]006

Date of Inscription: Oct. 20, 2006 at 10:45 a.m.

This Cert. of Title is issued in lieu of the lost/destroyed first copy of the same previously declared null and void.

[Illegible Signature]
JOSEPHINE H. PONCIANO
Actg. Reg. of Deeds.36

Stock must be taken, too, of Dela Cruz's insistence that Galvez succeeded in obtaining a new title to the disputed property based on the latter's untruthful claim that the original thereof was destroyed by a flood, (even though the said original title, OCT No. 8257, was never in fact lost) and was still in the possession of Obispo Representante at Pastor General ng Iglesia ni JesuKristo "Bagong Jerusalem" Inc. Hence, the issuance of the reconstituted title was irregular and improper because the alleged corporation which owned the disputed property was not yet in existence when the alleged original title was issued.

"When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in [her] pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession."37 In other words, "[w]here the parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon that issue to determine who between the parties has the better right to possess the property. However, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to that of possession, adjudication of the ownership issue is not final and binding, but only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession":38

We need not repeatedly belabor the issue in an ejectment case:

X X X The principal issue must be possession de facto, or actual possession, and ownership is merely ancillary to such issue. The summary character of the proceedings is designed to quicken the determination of possession de facto in the interest of preserving the peace of the community, but the summary proceedings may not be proper to resolve ownership of the property. Consequently, any issue on ownership arising in forcible entry or unlawful detainer is resolved only provisionally for the purpose of determining the principal issue of possession. x x x39

"Indeed, a title issued under the Torrens system is entitled to all the attributes of property ownership, which necessarily includes possession."40 Nevertheless, "an ejectment case will not necessarily be decided in favor of one who has presented proof of ownership of the subject property. Key jurisdictional facts constitutive of the particular ejectment case filed must be averred in the complaint and sufficiently proven."41

Quite independently of the foregoing, what further strengthens herein respondents' posture was petitioner's utter failure to adduce proof that he merely tolerated respondents' possession of the disputed property. In Corpuz v. Spouses Agustin,42 this Court recognized that even as the registered owner generally has the right of possession as an attribute of ownership, nevertheless the dismissal of the complaint for unlawful detainer is justified where proof of preponderant evidence of material possession of the disputed premises has not been convincingly adduced –

x x x Petitioner is correct that as a Torrens title holder over the subject properties, he is the rightful owner and is entitled to possession thereof. However, the lower courts and the appellate court consistently found that possession of the disputed properties by respondents was in the nature of ownership, and not by mere X X X X The pronouncement in Co v. Militar was later reiterated in Spouses Pascual v. Spouses Coronel and in Spouses Barias v. Heirs of Bartolome Boneo, et al., wherein we consistently held the age-old rule that the person who has a tolerance of the elder Corpuz. In fact, they have been in continuous, open and notorious possession of the property for more than 30 years up to this day.

XXXX

The pronouncement in Co v. Militar was later reiterated in Spouses Pascual v. Spouses Coronel and in Spouses Barias v. Heirs of Bartolonie Boneo, et al., wherein we consistently held the age-old rule that the person who has a Torrens Title over a land is entitled to possession thereof.’

However, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the present petitioner has instituted an unlawful detainer case against respondents. It is an established fact that for more than three decades, the latter have been in continuous possession of the subject property, which, as such, is in the concept of ownership and not by mere tolerance of petitioner's father. Under these circumstances, petitioner cannot simply oust respondents from possession through the summary procedure of an ejectment proceeding.43

In the case at bench, petitioner miserably failed to substantiate its claim that it merely tolerated respondents' possession of the disputed property. Indeed, "[w]ith the averment here that the respondent[s'] possession was by mere tolerance of the petitioner, the acts of tolerance must be proved, for bare allegation of tolerance did not suffice. At least, the petitioner should show the overt acts indicative of [its] or [its) predecessor's tolerance x x x But [it] did not adduce such evidence,"44 as in this case. It is thus quite evident from the allegations and evidence presented by petitioner that its claim that it merely tolerated respondents' entry into and possession of the disputed property, is baseless and unsubstantiated. Furthermore, while possession is a question of fact which is generally not allowed to be raised in a Rule 45 petition, the MeTC, RTC, and CA made no finding in respect to the question of tolerance as discussed above.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED for lack of merit.

Without costs.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

(On leave)
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO*
Chief Justice

NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM
Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decisionhad been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice

Footnotes

* On leave.

** Designated as Acting Chairperson per Special Order No. 2540 Jated February 28, 2018.

1 Rollo, pp. 10-37.

2 Id. at 41-52: penned by Associate Justice Agnes Reyes-Carpio and concurred in by Associate Justices Rosalinda Asuncion Vicente and Priscilla J. Baitazar-Padilla.

3 Id. at 53-54.

4 CA rollo, pp. 35A-42; penned by Judge Celso R L. Magsino, Jr.

5 Id, at 43-48; penned by Judge Edison F. Quintin.

6 Records (Volume 1), pp. 1-6.

7 Id. at 1-4.

8 Records (Volume II), pp. 94-116.

9 Records (Volume I), pp. 16-21.

10 Also referred to as Obispo Representante at Pastor General ng Iglesia ni Jesu Cristo "Bagong Jerusalem Inc., Obispo Representante at Pastor General ng Iglesia ni JesuCristo "Bagong Jerusalem" Inc. and as Obispo Representante at Pastor General ng Iglesia ni Jesu-Kristo "Bagong Jerusalem" Inc. in some parts of the records.

11 Records (Volume I), pp. 16-19.

12 Id. at 112-117.

13 The attached photocopy of OCT No. 8257 is in the name of "Iglesia De Jesucristo Jerusalem Nueva of Manila, Philippines, Inc."; id. at 118-119.

14 CA rollo, pp. 43-48.

15 Id. at 48.

16 Records (Volume I), pp. 172-173.

17 Id. at 180.

18 CA rollo, pp. 35A-42.

19 Id. at 42.

20 Id. at 150.

21 Rollo, pp. 41-52.

22 Id. at 51.

23 CA rollo, pp. 201-210.

24 Rollo, pp. 53-54.

25 Id. at 10-37.

26 Id. at 17.

27 Id. at 10-37.

28 Id. at 133-148.

29 Id. at 158-184.

30 ld. at 120-126.

31 Id. at 201-205.

32 Diaz v. Punzalan, G.R. No. 203075, March 16, 2016, 787 SCRA 531, 535-536.

33 Rollo, pp. 49-51.

34 OCT No. (8257) M-35266 per Records (Volume I, p. 8 (Annex "B" of petitioner's Complaint).

35 The attached photocopy of OCT No. 8257 is in the name of "Iglesia De Jesucristo Jerusalem Nueva of Manila, Philippines, Inc."; id. at 118-119.

36 Dorsal portion of OCT No. (8257) M-35266 per id. at 8 (Annex "B" of petitioner's Complaint).

37 Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court

38 Corpuz v. Spouses Agustin, 679 Pril. 352, 360 (2012).

39 Penta Pacific Realty Corporation. v. Ley Construction and Development Corporation, 747 Phil. 672, 686 (2014).

40 Corpuz v. Spouses Agustin, Supra note 38 at 361.

41 Dr. Carbonilla v. Abiera, 639 Phil. 473, 481 (2010).

42 Supra note 38.

43 Id. at 361-363.

44 Quijano v. Amante, 745 Phil. 40,52 (2014).

*Per Special Order No. 2539 dated February 28, 2018.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

---